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THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ 
HAS IT SUBSIDED? 
 
 
Maha Kenaee 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis attempts three related tasks. First, it surveys the historic record which 
provides uncontestable evidence that Kuwait was never part of the Ottoman 
Empire and thus never formed a single administrative or political unit with Iraq or 
part of it. Second, it traces the turbulent history of Kuwait‟s relationship with Iraq 
ever since the latter achieved independence in 1932; arguing that this turbulent 
relationship invited the intervention of regional and international players due to 
the strategic importance of Kuwait, especially since the discovery of oil. Third, it 
speculates on the prospects for overhauling this relationship, in light of: 1) the 
major transformations that Iraq has underwent since the downfall of Saddam 
Hussein and the Baath regime in 2003; and 2) the growing power of Iran in the 
Arabian (Persian) Gulf. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What follows is a study of Kuwait‟s troubled relationship with its far 
larger and stronger neighbor Iraq. Since Iraq‟s historic claims on Kuwait have 
emanated mainly from the notion that Kuwait was part of the Basra region in 
ottoman times, the first part of the study provides a chronological historic 
examination of Kuwait‟s political status where historic records (including 
frequently ignored sources in Arabic and travelers‟ accounts) as well as historical 
facts were used to demonstrate the frailness of this claim. Subsequent parts trace 
the evolution of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations since Iraq‟s independence, highlighting 
the respective roles of Kuwaiti diplomacy and the interests of regional and 
international players (primarily Britain and later the United States) in safeguarding 
Kuwait‟s independence vis-à-vis Iraqi onslaughts which took the form of an 
outright invasion and short-lived occupation in 1990. Most importantly, the last 
part documents the changes that have been taking place since the downfall of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003 and speculates on the prospects for a far more amicable 
relationship between the two neighboring countries. To a large extent, this thesis 
is about transcending the past in order to establish a better future for both parties. 
But in order to transcend the past, it must first be fully understood. 
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Two decades ago, the world witnessed Iraq‟s invasion of the small State of 
Kuwait. On 2 August 1990, Kuwait woke up finding itself under siege. Under 
Saddam Hussein, Iraq had unilaterally launched a war against its neighbor. In 
addition to being the first war of the post-cold war period, this was also the first 
conflict of its kind to be televised on a global scale. Kuwait‟s occupation at the 
hands of Saddam‟s forces soon became an international crisis. 
The mounting international opprobrium was not without its geopolitical 
considerations. This study tackles geopolitics through illustrating the stem of 
tension towards Kuwait. Kuwait is a small state with a geostrategic location on the 
far northwestern corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Spanning a total of 17,818 
km.
2
, its territory includes nine islands, among them Warbah and Bubiyan. It is 
surrounded by much larger states, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia bordering it 
from the west and south, the Arabian Gulf from the east (within a short distance 
from Iran), and Iraq from the north. Accordingly, Kuwait is situated in a vital spot 
in the Gulf region with an abundant oil wealth, making it a major oil exporter into 
the global market. These ecumenical conditions have naturally made Kuwait into 
a vulnerable state and the focus of external territorial ambitions. 
Having Iraq as a neighbor proved at times to be a difficult situation for 
Kuwait whereby its northern neighbor had continuously threatened the oil-rich 
sheikhdom‟s security. Nevertheless, there were intermittent periods where the 
relations between the two countries were normal, to say the least. The nature of 
the Iraqi regimes who have previously governed Iraq were the source of turbulent 
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relations with Kuwait, starting with Iraq‟s independence in 1932; then again in 
1963 under the unstable and Soviet-leaning regime of Abdulkareem Qasim (1958-
1963); during the nationalist period of Abdulsalam Arif (1963-1968); and most 
notably during the Ba‟athist regime (1968-2003) led by Saddam Hussein. Though 
Iraq had at times claimed Kuwaiti territory as their rightful inheritance from the 
Ottoman Empire, historical facts prove otherwise and show that Kuwait‟s 
sovereignty was granted de facto recognition long before the modern Iraq came 
into existence as a united and independent political entity.  
In 1923, Kuwait was the first state to have fixed international borders
1
 in 
the Arabian Peninsula. As Iraq wanted more access to the Gulf waters, its 
ambitions naturally oriented themselves towards Kuwaiti waters, particularly vis-
à-vis Kuwait‟s ownership of the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan situated in the 
north of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. The border demarcation issue was a lingering 
source of tension throughout their relations. Iraq had neither bound itself to 
respect the boundary demarcation that had been agreed upon with Kuwait in the 
exchange of correspondences in 1932, nor to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi Agreed Minutes of 
4 October 1963. Kuwait thus faced growing threats from Iraq in 1990 which 
marked the climax of hostility by Iraq towards Kuwait. Under Saddam, Iraq 
invaded and occupied the whole of Kuwait. The international community 
                                                          
1
 For literature with a specific interest in theories of international relations regarding borders, see: 
“Of Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System” by 
Friedrich Kratochwil; Identities, borders, orders: rethinking international relations theory by 
Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid; Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural Politics by 
Scott Michaelsen, David E. Johnson. 
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condemned Iraq‟s aggression and the United Nations placed Iraq under many 
sanctions with respect to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter whereby it 
issued many resolutions concerning Kuwait‟s territorial integrity, asking Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwaiti land. The United States formed a multinational coalition 
and under U.N. patronage initiated military action to restore Kuwait‟s sovereignty. 
Many resolutions were issued regarding the Iraq-Kuwait situation, some which 
mentioned the border demarcation between the two countries, such as U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 773 (1992) and 833 (1993). In 1994, Iraq 
formally accepted the United Nations‟ demarcated border with Kuwait.  
This study consists of six chapters including this introduction and a 
conclusion. Chapters Two and Three briefly provide further historical background. 
Chapter Two traces and provides main historical facts in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries about Kuwait‟s international status, proving Iraq‟s historical 
territorial claims of Kuwait false. Chapter Three highlights incidents and political 
actuality in the periods following Iraq‟s admission to the League of Nations; it 
also discusses Iraqi concerns over Kuwaiti territory under the different regimes 
that have come to rule Iraq while defining their various motives and agendas. 
Chapter Four focuses on the United Nations‟ reaction against Saddam 
Hussein‟s deed through the drawn resolutions in the Security Council relating to 
the border issues, especially with regards to Resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 
773 (1992) and 833 (1993). These particular resolutions will be given due focus in 
that they contain articles concerning border treaties between Kuwait and Iraq vis-
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à-vis border demarcation. The chapter will also describe the final borders between 
Kuwait and Iraq as set by the United Nations Iraqi Kuwait Border Demarcation 
Commission (UNIKBDC). 
Chapter Five discusses whether Iraq‟s territorial claims to Kuwait have 
ended with the United Nations settlement of Kuwait‟s crisis and, more recently, 
with the fall of Saddam‟s regime. It also discusses unresolved issues between the 
two countries and Iraq‟s international status under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter. Chapter five also provides a current measure of enhancing cooperative 
ties within the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations via projects with mutual economic interests. 
This study raises the question of whether building amicable relations and 
setting a foundation of integrated interests between two countries enhances 
cooperation and coordination and if it virtually diminishes the prospect of any 
unstable circumstances between two countries. With a dictator absent from the 
newly-democratic Iraq‟s calculus, and with a few residual issues still unsettled, 
would reaching mutual coordinated, cooperative relations between Kuwait and 
Iraq ridicule the prospect of provoking the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Kuwait? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: KUWAIT IN THE EIGHTEENTH & 
NINETEENTH CENTURIES 
 
Historically, Kuwait has faced many challenges throughout its 
development. Kuwait‟s early political and economic development was much 
affected by its location on the northwest coast of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kuwait became the focus of 
competition between the main international players at that time: the Ottoman 
Empire, Russia, Germany and Great Britain. Regionally, Kuwait also found itself 
in an environment of intense rivalry where it faced threats from neighboring Arab 
tribes. Kuwait has thus been witness to many external threats while on the path of 
survival and existence as an independent state. Historically, the security and 
sovereignty of this oil-rich sheikhdom has faced many pitfalls; however, Kuwait 
has adopted many successful decisions enabling it to maneuver and escape 
hegemony over its territory by signing strategic treaties with Great Britain since 
the nineteenth century. 
 
2.1 - Evidence of Kuwait’s Independence 
Though there is no specific date to the founding of Kuwait, history dates 
Kuwait‟s modern establishment to 1716, when the Al-Sabah, Al-Jalahimah and 
the Al-Khalifah tribes, who belong to the greater Enaiza tribe, first settled in the 
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northern parts of Kuwait‟s bay. Historical records depicting maps of Kazima (a 
populous settlement in the western outskirts of Kuwait), dating back to the period 
between 1652 and 1737, establish Kuwait‟s existence well before the eighteenth 
century. Moreover, the first documentation of Kuwait was in 1709 by an Arab 
Voyager named Murtada bin Ulwan who produced a manuscript (now stored in 
the Berlin State Library in Germany under the reference 6127) documenting his 
journey starting from Damascus until reaching Meccca. He mentions Kuwait as 
having a well-developed economic structure with buildings and marketplaces. He 
also makes reference to Kuwait as “Grane”. Furthermore, Kuwait‟s governance 
has been under the still-governing family of Al-Sabah. Before the migration of the 
Al-Sabah, Al-Jalahinah and the Al-Khalifah tribes, the Bani Khalid tribe had, 
while under the leadership of Mohamed Bani Urai‟er, built a fortress called al-
Kout.
2
 With the passing of Mohamed Bani Urai‟er, the Al-Sabah tribe became the 
rulers of Kuwait where merchant families of Kuwait selected Sheikh Sabah bin 
Jaber as Kuwait‟s leader.3 
Another mention proving Kuwait‟s presence well before the eighteenth 
century is one that states that the Portuguese had control over Muscat until their 
expulsion by Omani Imam Sultan bin Saif in 1650 as an extension of the 
                                                          
2
 Alrushaid, A. (1926). Tareekh Al-Kuwait – Al-juza‘ Al-Awwal [Kuwait History – Part One]. Kuwait: Al-
Matba‟ah Al-Asreyya [The Modern Press House]. p. 12 
3
 Abu Hakima, A. (1970). Tareekh Al-Kuwait: Al-Juz‘ Al-Awwal/Al-Qesm Al-Thani [History of Kuwait: 
Volume One/Part Two]. Kuwait: Kuwait History Committee. pp. 106-109. 
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revolution started by Imam Nasser bin Murshid in 1624.
4
 Imam Nasser bin 
Murshid had sent messengers to the Gulf countries to raise funds and materials in 
preparation to revolt and he had received money and a ship from the people of 
Grane – the archaic name of Kuwait.5 With all this said, modern history for 
Kuwait had started.  
Objective impartial historic accounts along the history of Kuwait prove 
that Kuwait, under all circumstances and development in the Gulf region, had 
enjoyed an independent entity untouched by Ottoman suzerainty and that the 
Ottoman Empire had no nominal authority or legal bearing on Kuwait‟s 
sovereignty. Many facts substantiate that there was no Ottoman presence on 
Kuwaiti land and that the Ottoman Empire never protected the territory of Kuwait 
against any outside attacks. Kuwaitis themselves were ensuring the protection of 
their homeland and, without the help of any outside forces, built a fortified wall 
around their city in 1760.
6
 Kuwait had offered asylum for rebel movements in 
Basra against the Ottoman Empire in 1789 and had challenged the Ottoman 
Pasha‟s demands to return them.7 Furthermore, Kuwait served as an asylum for 
Ottoman officials such as the governor of Basra who escaped to Kuwait to evade 
                                                          
4
 Miles, S. (1919). The countries and tribes of the persian gulf. London: Harrison. Retrieved from 
<http://ia600302.us.archive.org/15/items/countriestribeso02mileuoft/countriestribeso02mileuoft.pdf>. p. 
463. 
5
 Mohammed, K. (2000). Al-Kuwait Fi Al-Qarnayn Al-Thamen'ashar Wa Al-Tase'ashar. Kuwait City: Dar 
Al-Urooba. 
6
 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation: Historical Rights and International Will. (1994) Kuwait: Center for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait. p. 9 
7
 Ibid., p. 9 and Schofield, R. (1993). Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. p.4 
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punishment of the Pasha of Baghdad.
8
 In Colonal James Capper‟s A Journal 
across the Great Desert, from Aleppo to Bussora, the Ottoman Pasha was quoted, 
after his restless attempts to convince Kuwait‟s Sheikh to give up his guest, 
saying, “After all, I regard it as a great happiness to have, in case of a rainy day, a 
person of the temper of the Shaikh of Grain, so near to me.” 9  
As such, historical incidents show that Kuwait has never been part of or 
under Ottoman supremacy. The historian Abu Hakima wrote about Kuwait‟s 
history, saying: “There was no Ottoman ruler in Eastern Arabia. In fact, Ottoman 
rule was not even nominally acknowledged.”10 The historical narratives are thus 
quite lucid in contending that there was never any Turkish authority representing 
Ottoman governance, nor was there a Turkish garrison in Kuwait. Additionally, 
Ottoman taxes were not enforced on Kuwait and Kuwaiti men were not 
conscripted into the Ottoman army.
11
 
Furthermore, in the period between 1793 until 1795, the British Agency, 
which was connected to the British East India Company, moved from Basra to 
Kuwait in order to avoid disturbances from the Ottoman Authority in Basra.
12
 
Additionally, in 1982, the center of Arabian Gulf Studies in Basra University 
published a book about the records of the jurisprudential court in Basra. This book 
                                                          
8 Finnie, D. (1992) Shifting Lines in the Sand. London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 5 
9 Abu Hakima. op.cit, pp. 10, 14-15. 
10
 Ibid., p. 5 
11
 Ibid., p. 7 
12
 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, pp. 4, 10 
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talked about, among other matters, the Islamic court judge who had intended to 
escape to Kuwait in an attempt to avoid being forced to be a judge and a teacher in 
Baghdad. The publication also illustrates that the judicial system in Basra, along 
with its various statutes, were much different than those in Kuwait.  
Kuwait has long been adamant about its independence, viewing this crucial 
tenet of statehood with the utmost importance. In 1816, during the rule of Jaber 
Al-Sabah (1814–1859), an English adventurer named James Silk Buckingham 
observed that Kuwait always preserved its independence however disorderly 
affairs might be in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, particularly as most other Gulf 
entities were falling under Portuguese or Ottoman rule. He also emphasized that 
the people of Kuwait were known for their love of freedom and courage.
13
 
In a letter dating 18 April 1866,
14
 Kuwait‟s relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire was described by ex-Political Resident Kemball as “contractual,” whereby 
Kuwait protected the shores of Shatt al-Arab from attacks by sea in return for not 
paying taxes or tribute to the Ottoman treasury and for the nominal subordination 
of the Al-Sabah sheikhdom.
15
 
With the rise of Sheikh Mubarak who won the struggle for power in 1896, 
Kuwait severed its links with the Ottoman Empire. Mubarak never favored 
Ottoman influence and when the Ottomans supported his rivals he became even 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., pp. 4 – 5 and Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, pp. 11 - 12. 
14
 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 11 
15
 Ibid., p. 11 
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closer to the British. At the time when there was concern about the growth of 
Ottoman cooperation with the Germans as well as with the Russians, there were 
attempts to construct a Berlin-to-Baghdad railway which would be linked to 
Kuwait‟s harbor. Additionally, reports were received that the Ottomans were 
stationing troops near Basra.
16
  
In 1897, Sheikh Mubarak asked for British protection and his request was 
supported by the political resident in the Gulf at that time, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Malcolm Meade. Mubarak highlighted the potential British gains of such support, 
contending that Kuwait has fine anchorage; that its territories would be convenient 
for a British trans-Arabian railway; and that through Kuwait, piracy and slave 
trade in the Northern Gulf could be controlled.
17
 As a result, Britain and Kuwait 
signed an agreement on 23 January 1899 which was ratified by Lord Curzon, 
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on 16 February 1899 in Fort William in 
India.
18
 This Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement, Kuwait‟s first legal bond with the 
British, has had a profound effect on Kuwait‟s history. Through this agreement, 
Kuwait was able to maintain its independent character and its people‟s 
independent identity. The agreement, though secretly conducted, had protected 
Kuwait‟s international status especially since it was in a region where powerful 
                                                          
16
 Ibid., pp. 16 – 17and Cordesman, A. (1997). Kuwait : recovery and security after the Gulf War. Colorado: 
Westview Press. pp. 3 - 4. 
17
 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, pp. 15-17. 
18
 Facey, W. & Grant, G. (1999) Kuwait by the First Photographers. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 36 and Kuwait 
and Britain: A Historical Friendship. (2007). Kuwait: Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. pp. 17-
19. 
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rivals were competing for leverage in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Kuwait was thus 
able to escape Ottoman efforts at suzerainty. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement contained promises by Sheikh Mubarak 
that neither he nor his successors would ever yield, sell, lease or mortgage any 
part of Kuwait‟s territory or receive the agents or representatives of any foreign 
country without prior permission from the British government.
19
 The agreement 
had given the British implicit control over Kuwait‟s foreign policy, but it was 
never a mandate. In return, the British promised Kuwait the support and protection 
of its security. Additionally, the British sent Sheikh Mubarak 15,000 rupees and 
guaranteed the Sheikh their good offices as well as their legal and political 
commitment, which also covered the protection of Mubarak‟s property near 
Basra.
20
 Lt. Col. Malcom John Meade, the political resident in the Gulf in 1897, 
predicted that the agreement will “stand in the way of attempts by other powers, or 
their subjects, to obtain foothold in this important place.” 21 
Suspicious about the relations between the British and Kuwait, the 
Ottomans in 1901 exchanged diplomatic notes with the British. This resulted in 
setting official confirmation that set the basis for British-Ottoman relations 
concerning Kuwait. This is known as the “status quo” whereby the British 
government would maintain its ties with Kuwait but would not establish a 
                                                          
19
 Resalat Al-Kuwait [Kuwait‘s Letter]. (2011). Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 33 (1) . p. 7. 
20
 Finnie. op. cit, pp.16-17. 
21
 Ibid., p. 17. 
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“protectorate” in Kuwait22 and the Ottomans would keep a distance from 
interfering in Kuwait especially by not sending military forces to Kuwait.
23
 On 
many occasions after this understanding, the Ottoman Empire tried unsuccessfully 
to destabilize the sheikhdom either by backing up and supporting Kuwait‟s rivals 
or by threatening Kuwait through removing Mubarak by force. Nevertheless, 
Kuwait has always successfully resisted efforts aimed at bringing them into the 
Ottoman orbit.
 24
 
However, in a bid to reduce the dominion of the Sheikh of Kuwait, the 
Ottomans sent troops to Safwan, Umm Qasr, Warbah, and the eastern tip of 
Bubiyan Island, which is also called Ras al-Gait. The island was probably named 
by Kuwaiti tribesmen, as Al-Gait is an old Kuwaiti word meaning summer. 
Sheikh Mubarak objected to the Ottoman aggression on his territory and asserted 
jurisdiction over these areas, stating that permanent settlers in the Safwan area had 
paid a sort of tribute to the Sheikh and that certain loyal Safwan tribes often visit 
the oasis.
25
 Moreover, the Al-Sabah‟s ancestral home was in Umm Qasr, where, in 
the early nineteenth century, certain Kuwaiti tribesmen also settled there.
26
 It is 
believed that during the reign of Jabir, a fort was built there as well. Furthermore, 
Sheikh Mubarak mentioned that in the 1860s the Al-Sabah subjects resided there 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., p. 20 and Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 22. 
23
 Ibid., 
24 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 22. 
25
 Here, „oasis‟ refers to the center of Kuwait. 
26 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 24 
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and that the sheikhdom sometimes used to transit through Khor al-Zubair while on 
their way to Basra.
27
 
The map below was excerpted from William Gifford Palgrave‟s book “A 
Year‟s Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862 – 1863)” published in 
1864 in England, denoting Kuwait‟s boundary and its surroundings. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Kuwait in the mid 1800’s28 
Palgrave identified each country‟s boundaries by a distinct color. The upper 
region included in Kuwait‟s territory includes Khor al-Zubair, where there was 
also specific mention that Bubiyan Island pertains to Kuwait.
29
 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p. 25  
28
 Al-Sadoon, A. (2010) Kuwait in old maps. Kuwait: Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. p. 135 
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Additionally, Knox, Political Agent at Kuwait, had interviewed a number 
of Awazim fishermen who provided him with reliable evidence for the Awazim 
tribe‟s long-established contact with the islands, where a number of fishermen had 
their nets placed and where they practiced pearl diving on the coasts of Bubiyan.
30
 
A fisherman from the Awazim tribe, whose loyalty was for Sheikh Mubarak and 
who paid allegiance to the Shiekh, periodically used Bubiyan, which is the stem of 
Kuwait‟s rights to the island as well as for Warba Island, which is an offshoot of 
Bubiyan and is geographically contingent to it.
31,32
 Warba Island is only separated 
by a very narrow channel from Bubiyan. This proves strong evidence for the 
Awazim‟s historical presence in the area.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, other nations also claimed 
Kuwait‟s ownership of Warbah. This was done firstly through the Government of 
India‟s memorandum in 1910, which stated that the ownership of Warbah follows 
that of Bubiyan because of its location north of Bubiyan and because of its close 
proximity,
33
 and secondly by the map annexed to the July 1913 settlement where a 
red line marked the borders of Kuwait, encompassing both the islands of Warbah 
and Bubiyan. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
29
 Ibid., p. 134 
30 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 35 
31 Ibid., p.25 and Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, p.20 
32 Finnie. op. cit, pp. 22 - 23 
33 Ibid., pp. 35-36 
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However by this aggression of the Ottomans in the northern areas of 
Kuwait, the region witnessed its first conflict between Kuwait and the Ottoman 
Empire. Britain protested to the Ottoman Porte and considered the occupation a 
disturbance of the status quo understanding.
34
 
 
2.2 - The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 
In 1911 when there were still talks about the Baghdad railway involving 
the Ottomans, Great Britain and the Germans, and with Kuwait‟s bay being the 
possible terminus in the Gulf, Britain felt the need to restate the 1901 status quo 
agreed upon with the Ottoman Porte.
35
 Britain wanted to strengthen its position in 
Kuwait and to prevent any pretext from the Ottomans to intervene in Kuwait‟s 
position, specifically by the Ottoman Porte‟s constant meddling in Kuwait which 
sought to get rid of Sheikh Mubarak. 
Britain entered into negotiations with the Turks in 1911 with the intended 
goal of adding clarifications to the status quo agreement regarding Kuwait‟s 
boundaries.
36
 Finally on 29 July 1913, the treaty was signed but not ratified due to 
the outbreak of World War I. However, the importance of this treaty was that it 
depicted the subsequent affairs involving Kuwait, Britain and Iraq.
37
 This treaty is 
                                                          
34 Finnie. op. cit, p.21 
35
Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 37 
36 Ibid., p. 37-38 
37
 Finnie. op. cit, pp. 34-35 
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composed of five sections with the first section involving Kuwait [Ref. Appendix 
1]. 
“Article 1: The district of Kuwait as defined in Articles 5 and 7 of this 
agreement shall constitute an independent territory in the Ottoman Empire. 
Article 2: The Sheikh of Kuwait can, as he used to in the past, hoist the 
Ottoman flag in addition to the word [Kuwait] to be inscribed in one of the 
flag‘s corners, if he so desires. He may also exercise an independent 
administration in the regional area as defined by Article [5] of the 
agreement. The Imperial Ottoman State shall refrain from any intervention 
in the affairs of Kuwait, including the inheritance [of rulership], and any 
other administrative act as well as any occupation or military action in the 
provinces belonging to Kuwait. 
Article 3: The Imperial Ottoman Government recognizes the validity of the 
agreements formerly concluded by the Sheikh of Kuwait with the 
Government of His Majesty the King of Britain dated January 23, 1899; 
May 24, 1900, and February 28, 1904. It also recognizes the validity of the 
land concessions granted from the said Sheikh to the Government of His 
Majesty the King and to the British nationals, and recognizes the validity of 
the demands enclosed with the memorandum sent on Oct. 24, 1911 from 
His Majesty‘s First Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of His 
Imperial Majesty the Sultan in London. 
… 
 18 
 
Article 5: The independence of the Sheikh of Kuwait can be exercised in the 
defined districts forming a semi-circle with the City of Kuwait in the Centre 
and Khor al-Zubair in the northern border and the Grane in the southern 
border, and this line drawn in red on the map attached to this agreement, 
and the island of Warba, Bubiyan, Meskan, Failaka, Auha, Kubbar, Garoa 
and Um al-Maradem in addition to the neighboring islands and the waters 
in this region. 
Article 6: The tribes inside the borders agreed upon in the next article shall 
be recognized as subordinate to the Shaikh of Kuwait who levies the Zakat 
as he used to do formerly. He shall exercise the administrative rights 
invested in him as an Ottoman Qu‘immaqam. The Imperial Ottoman 
Government shall not exercise in these regions any administrative act 
independent of the Shaikh of Kuwait and shall refrain from establishing 
garrisons or undertaking any military action of any type without prior 
understanding with the Government of His Majesty…‖ 38 
It is in studying these articles that we may glean certain contradictory 
features in some of the contents of the agreement. In Article 1, Kuwait was 
recognized as an independent district in the Ottoman Empire, but not subordinate 
to Vilayet al-Basra.
39
 Therefore, Iraq‟s claims of Kuwaiti territory, which contend 
that Kuwait was part of Vilayet al-Basra under the Ottoman Empire, are not valid. 
                                                          
38 For the full excerpt, see Appendix 1. Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, pp. 25 - 27 
39 Ibid., p. 27 
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Also, Article 1 did not recognize Turkish suzerainty over Kuwait. What came in 
Article 2 and Article 6 contradicted any subordination to the Ottomans which was 
stated in Article 1. The articles stopped the Ottomans from intervening in 
Kuwait‟s affairs either administratively or militarily. Even in regards to raising the 
Ottoman flag, which contained Islamic symbols,
40
 Kuwait distinguished its flag by 
writing the world Kuwait on one of the flag‟s corners.41 
In Article 3 of the treaty, the Ottomans recognized the validity of the 
agreements concluded by the Sheikh of Kuwait and the government of Britain
42
 
which entailed recognition of Kuwait‟s sovereignty. Furthermore, it granted 
Kuwait the legal right to conclude agreements with other states, as well as 
recognizing the validity of said agreements, a notion which holds profound legal 
significance.
43
 Articles 5 and 6 discuss Kuwait‟s territory as two different regions: 
the inner zone and the outer zone, as depicted below (red and green, respectively). 
                                                          
40 The crescent and stars are considered Islamic symbols 
41 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, pp. 22-23, 28 
42 Such as 1899, 1900 „s commitment of arms control, 1904‟s post office agreement, and 1907‟s continuous 
lease agreement of Bandar Shuwaikh providing the British Government‟s assurance regarding the 
Sheikh‟s sovereignty over Kuwait and its boundaries (inclusive of the leased land.) 
43 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, p. 28 
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Figure 2: Map showing the Red (inner) and Green (outer) lines of Kuwaiti territorial authority as 
defined in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention
44
 
 
The inner-zone is depicted by a semi-circle containing the City of Kuwait in the 
center with Khor al-Zubair and al-Qurayyin as the northern and southern limits, 
respectively.
45
 This region included all of Kuwait‟s islands (Warba, Bubiyan, 
Meskan, Failaka, Auha, Kubbar, Garoa and Um al-Maradem) as they are listed in 
the geographical and statistical section of J.G. Lorimer‟s Gazetteer of the Persian 
                                                          
44
 Brown H. (1994). The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: Historical Background and The U. N. Decisions of 
1992 and 1993. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 2 (3). p.68 
45 Finnie. op.cit,  p. 35 
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Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia
46
 as being part of Kuwait.
47
 Nevertheless, Sheikh 
Mubarak was unpleased because of the loss of the northern part of Kuwait and 
Kuwait‟s historical rights to Umm Qasr and Safwan. Kuwait‟s ownership to this 
northern territory was depicted in Lorimer‟s map of 1908 as a portion of Kuwaiti 
land, as depicted below. 
 
Figure 3: Map showing Kuwait’s territorial limits as stated by Lorimer 48 
                                                          
46
 Ibid., p. 23 
47 Ibid., p. 35 and Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, pp. 40-41 
48
 Ibid. p. 41 
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The outer-zone, which was mentioned in different articles within the treaty, is 
acknowledged by the subordination of tribes situated in a much larger area to the 
Sheikhdom.  
Sheikh Mubarak also passed on his dissatisfaction to Captain William 
Shakespeare, Political Agent in Kuwait, regarding an agreement permitting the 
stationing of a permanent Ottoman agent to look after the interests of his subjects. 
As stipulated by prior agreements, the Ottomans were to refrain from any 
interference in Kuwait; Sheikh Mubarak was thus naturally opposed to the 
proposal of appointing an Ottoman agent on Kuwaiti territory. In response to 
Mubarak‟s concerns, the British government “requested the Ottoman state to issue 
a statement agreeing to withdraw all its civil servants from Kuwait.”49 Through 
this request, the Ottoman Porte would not be able to appoint an agent in Kuwait.
50
 
The agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Empire had the Ottomans 
admit Kuwait‟s territorial rights over the Warbah and Bubiyan islands. The 
Ottomans therefore withdrew their garrison from Ras al-Gait, located southeast of 
Bubiyan Island. Furthermore, the articles that set the demarcation of the border 
between Kuwait and Vilayet al-Basra were the basics of the demarcation boundary 
between Kuwait and the newly-conceived State of Iraq. Its provisions were used 
in 1922 and in 1923 to set the territorial extent of the State of Kuwait with its 
neighbors.  
                                                          
49
 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, p. 29 
50
 Ibid., 
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2.3 - The Uqair Protocol of 1922  
The Uqair Protocol negotiation was held on the Hasa coast at Uqair in 
Saudi Arabia, opposite to the Sheikhdom of Bahrain.
51
 The negotiation was held 
between Ibn Saud and British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, on behalf of 
Iraq, to settle the borders of Ibn Saud with both Iraq and Kuwait. Present also 
were the Iraqi delegate, Sabih Beg; and the Political Agent in Kuwait, Major 
James More, representing Sheikh Ahmad.
52
 The Uqair Protocol had brought up for 
the first time the notion of a neutral zone in Arabia. On 2 December 1922, the Ibn 
Saud-Iraqi boundary was set, agreeing on a neutral zone which guarantees that 
wells and oases close to each side of the border shall not be used for military 
causes. The protocol assured that Najdi tribes could have safe access to watering 
places in Iraq‟s section within the neutral zone.53  
Sir Cox had provided Iraq with noteworthy territory claimed by Ibn Saud
54
 
and southern territorial limits of the newly created Kingdom of Iraq
55
 were 
defined. The Uqair Protocol also defined the Najd-Kuwait boundary and placed 
the frontiers of the south of Kuwait between the Al-Sabah sheikhdom of Kuwait 
and Ibn Saud‟s Najdi state. Boundaries were marked along the inner zone of the 
red line defined in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman settlement. The protocol also set the 
                                                          
51
 Finnie. op.cit, p. 57 
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boundary tripoint demarcation between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. 
Furthermore, a neutral zone between Kuwait and Najd extended southward from 
the red line along the Arabian (Persian) Gulf littoral. Nomadic tribes of both states 
enjoyed equal rights of access to this zone. 
With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Government of India 
stressed its role in Kuwait; accordingly, the sheikhdom received a letter from the 
Political Agent in the Gulf recognizing the Sheikhdom of Kuwait as an 
independent government under the protection of Britain. With the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1918, Kuwait‟s relationship with the Porte was completely 
dissolved. In 1920, the Porte gave up all its rights in the districts which were under 
its control through the Treaty of Sèvres. Its contents were reaffirmed in the Treaty 
of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923.
56
 
In September 1920, the Sheikh of Kuwait Salem Mubarak Al-Sabah had 
reaffirmed Kuwait‟s territory stated in the 1913 green line delimitation for 
Kuwait‟s northern borders. It was again stated on 4 April 1923 by Sheikh Ahmad 
Al-Jaber to the Political Agent in Kuwait, Major James More, regarding Kuwait‟s 
northern boundaries: 
―It is the same as that claimed by the late Shaikh Salim in the Appendix to 
his letter to you dated 3rd Muharram 1339 [17 September 1920]; namely: 
From the junction of the Wadi al-Aujah with the Batin; eastwards to the 
                                                          
56 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, p. 30 
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south of the wells of Safwan, Jabal Sanam and Umm Qasr, to the shore of 
the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, and along the coast to the present 
Najd—Kuwait frontier. Included in this are the following islands of the sea: 
Maskan, Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Karu and Umm al-Maradim. These are 
the boundaries of Kuwait which I claim‖57 
Political Agent More informed Cox, the British High Commissioner in Iraq, about 
the Sheikh‟s specification of Kuwait‟s northern territory. Cox replied on 19 April 
1923 that the Sheikh could be notified that his “claim to the frontier and Islands 
indicated is recognized in so far as his Majesty‟s government are concerned.”58 
This letter exchange among British officials is considered by Britain to have 
defined the Kuwait-Iraqi border.
59 
 
2.4 - Concluding Remarks 
Kuwait‟s first proof of existence dates back well before the eighteenth 
century. Throughout its history, Kuwait has been in a position of geostrategic 
significance, where attractive harbors and littoral coasts place Kuwait in the center 
of the eyes of regional powers. Nevertheless, Sheikh Mubarak‟s insight had 
secured Kuwait‟s autonomy and set the regional balance through initiating the 
                                                          
57 Schofield. Kuwait and Iraq op.cit, p. 59 
58 Ibid., 
59 Ibid., 
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secret agreement with Britain in 1899. Furthermore, the Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention of 1913 supported Kuwait in minimizing any chance the Ottomans 
saw in establishing suzerainty over Kuwait. Through the boundary delimitation of 
1923, the distinct boundaries between Kuwait and Iraq had not only been set but 
also gained unquestionable confirmation. It is interesting to note, however, that 
many maps since the early Ottoman era depict Kuwait and its territory as a portion 
extending further northward than its borderline as defined by the 1932 
correspondence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENTS AFTER IRAQ’S 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
In April of 1923, Kuwait had become the first state in the region to have designated 
international borders. This was not objected by Iraq at the time, and it was accepted again 
in 1932. In 1923, the Political Agent at Kuwait Major John More had located Kuwait‟s 
frontier by pacing out steps from the southern-most palm tree in Safwan and had marked it 
by putting a large signboard as a clear indicator for the borders between Kuwait and Iraq.
 60
 
During the 1930s, however, it was removed several times by the Iraqis. The British Agent 
in Kuwait had replaced the signboard by the same technique used by Agent More. It was 
later discovered that the Iraqis had planted palm trees southward from the initial palm tree 
and into Kuwaiti territory.
61 
 
3.1 - The Development of the Territorial Dispute 
Shortly after its independence, Iraq intended to request admission to the League of 
Nations. Among the most basic requirements for state acceptance into the League were a 
stable government and a well-defined frontier. The reaffirming of the Iraq-Kuwait borders, 
as they were initially delineated by the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 and by the 
1923 exchange of correspondence, occurred via the securing of letters signed by the Iraqi 
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Prime Minister Nuri al-Said on 21 July 1932. The letter, which was addressed to the British 
High Commissioner for Iraq, requested the reaffirming of the existing frontier between Iraq 
and Kuwait, as illustrated below: 
―My dear Sir Francis, 
I think your Excellency will agree that the time has now come when it is desirable to 
reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit. 
     I therefore request that the necessary action may be taken to obtain the 
agreement of the competent authority or authorities in Koweit to the following 
description of the existing frontier between the two countries: 
     From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence 
northwards along the Batim to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence 
eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them 
to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zubeir with the Khor Abdullah. The 
islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru 
and Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Koweit.‖ 62 
The Sheikh of Kuwait Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah respectively agreed to confirm the 
existing boundary between Kuwait and Iraq through a letter which he addressed to the 
British agent in Kuwait on 10 August 1932. He wrote that “the frontier proposed by the 
Iraqi Prime Minister is approved by his Majesty‟s Government” and agreed to “reaffirm the 
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existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit as described in the Iraq Prime Minister‟s 
letter;”63 for it was through this letter that the boundary delimitation between Kuwait and 
Iraq was unquestionably reconfirmed by Iraq. Iraq had thus met the criteria enabling it to be 
a member of the League of Nations, and on 3 October 1932, Iraq‟s Hashemite Monarchy 
was officially admitted into the League. 
 Nevertheless, the boundary demarcation between Kuwait and Iraq did not take 
place as it was expected. Drawing the line of the agreed frontier continued to be the core 
issue of all problematic relations between the two countries. History later unveiled Iraq‟s 
aspiration in regards to the Gulf States, proving these aspirations go beyond domestic 
politics.
64
 
Although no tragic events unfolded under the Hashemite Dynasty regarding the 
boundaries between Kuwait and Iraq (as there later was under different regimes), many 
violations occurred against Kuwait‟s borders. With the 1923 exchange of letters and the 
boundary delimitation in 1932, the Hashemite monarchy knew they had no legal rights in 
Kuwait‟s territory. Iraq‟s issue was that it was not satisfied with its territory and the 
boundary it had agreed upon with its neighbors, regarding Kuwait in particular
65
 and other 
neighbors in general. 
For Iraq, Kuwait was and has always been a small state with major geopolitical 
importance. Kuwait‟s territory includes two strategic islands in the north, Warbah and 
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Bubiyan. Kuwait‟s wealth also stems from the discovery of oil in substantial quantities 
under its land in 1936. Realizing the increased potential of the border issue exploding into a 
larger conflict, the British (being responsible for Kuwait‟s foreign relations) actively 
engaged in efforts with Kuwait‟s rulers to get Iraq‟s government to bilaterally demarcate 
the boundary between the two countries. Many committees were formed in a bid to 
demarcate the border; however during these negotiations, obstructions had a habit of rising 
and interfering with any such final agreement.
66
 Time and again, Iraq had brought up 
various obstacles, hindering the demarcating process with the intention of pressuring 
Kuwait to cede its vital northern territory. 
Under Hashemite rule, Iraq brought forward an assortment of issues concerning its 
neighbor. It would change its demands of Kuwait every few years, making it clear that Iraq 
wanted to be the beneficiary of the wealth found within Kuwait‟s territory.  
 
3.2 - The Issue of Smuggling 
During negotiations, Iraq prominently raised the issue of smuggling, describing it as 
the main difficulty concerning its relations with Kuwait.
67
 Iraq claimed that Kuwait‟s 
relatively low customs charges led to initiating the trade of smuggling which was 
threatening Iraq‟s economy.68 Iraq‟s first violation of Kuwait‟s borders occurred in May of 
1934 when an armed Iraqi government car drove into the borders of Kuwait and clashed 
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with resident tribes who were Kuwaiti subjects. Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, in his 
letter to Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, protested the Iraqi 
violations of Kuwait‟s borders: 
“We have heard that there is an armed Iraqi government car that drove 
inside Kuwaiti borders and intercepted the resident tribes who are Kuwaiti 
subjects. Therefore, it has been necessary to dispatch one of our cars to 
ascertain this. In fact we have sent a car with (civil) servants headed by a 
guide. We ordered them to wander within the borders of Kuwait and carry 
out the necessary investigations. They reached around al-Rawdah and 
headed to Um al-Madafi. There they found some of the Kuwaiti Arabs and 
inquired of them about the cars and informed them that they came to them 
every day. Radi al-Sumair‘s son, a Kuwaiti Arab residing in Um al-Madafi 
said that the car came to us on Friday 27 instant corresponding to 11 May, 
1937 and searched our homes and when we objected to their wrongdoing in 
searching the homes, they beat one of us with a stick. Among the Arabs who 
are residing in al-Labbah are the sons of Bara‘at who say that the cars go to 
them every day and then proceed southward. 
On the basis of this it has been assured that the cars drove in the 
borders of Kuwait and they clash with our tribes. This is a matter which we 
do not accept because we do not like anything to occur between us and our 
neighbors which may disturb the love and upset the rights of neighborhood. 
I have ordered our (civil) servant, the guide, to appear before Your 
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Excellency and inform you of the investigations he carried out. We ask you 
to inform your security posts about the ways to prevent the driving of these 
cars inside the borders for fear that a misunderstanding counter to 
neighborly rights may take place. May God preserve you. 
30 Muharram, 1353 corresponding to 14 May 1934. 
       Yours sincerely, 
Ruler of Kuwait” 69 
 
Other serious border incidents also started happening frequently and increasingly 
with Iraq‟s attempt to control and reduce any smuggling occurrences. The increase in these 
border violations mainly occurred within the channels around the islands of Warbah and 
Bubiyan.
70
 Furthermore, Dickson indicates that the majority of tribesmen who were 
involved in smuggling acts were natives of Persia, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
71
 The Sheikh of 
Kuwait had also taken all measures in his capability and capacity to put a halt to 
smuggling.
72
 Dickson also stated that if the Iraqi government seriously desired to decrease 
smuggling, they should either decrease their own customs taxes to be more within the range 
of nearby states or they should adopt Ibn Saud‟s strategy of recruiting reinforcement from 
tribes residing near the border-zone by presenting them with 75% of the tax proceeds of 
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any illegal imports they manage to prevent, adding that the Customs Department does not 
necessarily have to be a money-making government operation.
73
  
Dickson also suggests that Iraq‟s exaggeration of this issue stems from Iraq‟s desire 
to have power over Kuwait. The smuggling issue had impact on the necessity of the 
boundary demarcation between Kuwait and Iraq. Sound delineation of the boundaries have 
to be made in order to firstly make boundaries more secure against contraband trafficking, 
to also know where Kuwait‟s territorial authority ends and where Iraq‟s begins, and also to 
end Iraq‟s violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty. In spite of the fact that the 1923 exchange of 
letters had defined the Kuwait-Iraq border, which was also reaffirmed in the 1932 
correspondence, there was a need to activate and implement the border demarcation 
 
3.3 - Iraqi Ambitions on Kuwaiti Territory under Hashemite Rule 
In 1938, 15 years after the Ottomans had signed the Lausanne Treaty and given up 
any territory that they had previously controlled, Iraqi Foreign Minister Taufiq al-Suwaidi 
conveyed to the British Ambassador in Baghdad at the time, Sir Maurice Peterson, that he 
believed that Kuwait belongs to Iraq since it had been a part of the Vilayet of Basra during 
the Ottoman era. He then reiterated this claim in his letter to the Foreign Office officials 
prior to his visit to London later that year. He claimed the Iraqi government as a successor 
to the Ottoman Porte and claimed that the land on which Kuwait stands should actually be 
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added to Iraq.
74
 Nevertheless, these claims were not taken seriously by the Foreign Office. 
The British Embassy also replied to Al-Suwaidi stating that Anglo-Kuwaiti relations date 
back as far as the 1840s and that both the Kuwaiti nationality and the Iraqi nationality came 
into existence on the same day.
75
 
It comes as no shock, however, that these Iraqi claims over Kuwaiti territory arose 
only a few months after the discovery of abundant oil reserves in Kuwait,
76
 especially the 
Burgan oil well, which is one of the largest oil wells in the world to date.  
During the 1930s, Iraq had a dispute with Iran over its international status. Iraq had 
focused on Kuwait as the object of its territorial desire. After the Iraq-Iran agreement of 
1937, where Iraq had made concessions to Iran in half of Shatt Al-Arab,
77
 Iraq‟s Foreign 
Minister said in 1938 that Iraq wanted to possess an alternate channel to the Gulf through 
having a port on Kuwait‟s bay. Iraq aimed to increase its access to the Gulf waters as well 
as extend its railway beyond Basra to the coast of Kuwait on the Gulf. Iraq also wanted to 
shift its southern latitude from 30
0
N to 29
0
N 35
(78) 
such that the northern half of Kuwait 
would be under Iraqi control. This would have virtually deprived Kuwait of all territory 
north of its bay.  
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In return, Britain stated that it would allow neither the compromise of Kuwait‟s 
sovereignty nor its status under British protection and that the option of Iraq‟s railway 
terminus and port on Kuwait‟s bay must be disregarded.79 Thereafter, the British head of 
the Basra Port Directorate Sir John Ward suggested a similar project at Umm Qasr in 
October 1938 where the British government suggested to Iraq the possibility of building a 
port near Umm Qasr on the Khor Zubair. The British government was left in confusion as 
to whether the proposed port‟s location lay within Kuwaiti or Iraqi territory.80 In 1939 and 
1940, Iraq was requesting British support for its efforts at gaining territorial concessions 
from the Sheikh of Kuwait in order for them to protect the port„s approaches to Khor 
Zubair. However, the Government of India reasoned that this was not desirable and the 
political resident doubted whether Iraq really needed a port there
81
 – this was in accordance 
with Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber‟s stand in refusing to concede any portion of his territory.82  
Other attempts were presented to the Hashemite Iraqi government at demarcating 
the frontier with Kuwait, but these attempts were always met by Iraqi obstacles in order to 
prevent their progress. Iraq‟s aim was to get a large chunk of Kuwaiti territory in order to 
be the beneficiary of Kuwait‟s newly-discovered oil wealth. However despite all of this, the 
two countries witnessed times of cordial relations where they were able to ease certain 
intra-governmental procedures.  
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In the early 1950s, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah sought to conduct a 
friendly foundation for the relations between Iraq and Kuwait. The ruler of Kuwait sought 
to strengthen the ties between the two countries and showed interest on many occasions to 
visit Baghdad. In 1952, after the Kuwaiti Amir‟s visit to Hashemite Iraq, the Iraqi 
government was prepared to reduce entry visa fees for Kuwaitis wishing to visit Iraq. 
Furthermore, there was agreement that Kuwaitis, who travel to Iraq for a short period of 
time by car, be granted entry without paying customs duties on their vehicles. There was 
also agreement that certain agricultural goods may freely move across the borders between 
Kuwait and Iraq. In an attempt to further build friendly ties between the two countries, 
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem, during another visit to Iraq, gave generous contributions to 
Iraqi charities.
83
 
In 1955, Iraq publicized its aspiration “to advance its frontier to a depth of some 
four kilometers, covering a desert strip, the uninhabited island of Warbah and the waters of 
Khawr Abdallah which surround it.”84 Accordingly, the British Ambassador in Baghdad Sir 
Michael Wright presented the proposal of leasing the islands instead of the cession of 
Warbah and Bubiyan, linking it with the Shatt Al-Arab scheme to pipe fresh water to 
Kuwait. Wright also suggested that both proposals, the Umm Qasr proposal and the Shatt 
Al-Arab water proposal, be arranged on equivalent long-lease terms equal to 99 years.
85
 It 
was therefore that the new idea of leasing the Kuwaiti islands emerged in place of their 
cession. 
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The provisional approvals were soon retracted when the Iraqi prime minister 
introduced more demands before going on with the project settlement. He demanded that 
the Iraq Petroleum Company run an oil pipeline from its Zubair field to Mina al-Ahmadi – 
through Kuwait – on the Gulf coast of southern Kuwait. These proposals worried Kuwait 
and Kuwait sought to invest in distillation plants.
86
 Therefore, the Iraqi government said 
that the time was not right for a demarcation of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary.
87
  
These wanton demands coincided with an accumulation of incidents and statements 
which made Kuwait concerned about the intentions of the Iraqi government. Kuwait 
doubted Iraq‟s sincere will to go on with the demarcation process. Therefore, in 1957, the 
British revived their proposal but the Iraqi government insisted on their position that they 
would not demarcate the boundary with Kuwait unless their neighbor ceded or leased a four 
kilometer-wide territorial strip south of Umm Qasr and the Island of Warbah. Kuwait 
insinuated that the ceding or leasing of Warbah Island would be taken into consideration 
given that the Kuwait-Iraq boundary line becomes fully demarcated.
88
  
In 1958, Iraq formed a union with Jordan called the Arab Hashemite Union. Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Said had asked the British government to provide Kuwait with its 
independence so that Kuwait would join the Arab Hashemite Union. This provided solid 
acknowledgement from the Iraqi regime in recognition of Kuwait as an independent state. 
Al-Said stated that if Kuwait would join the Union, Iraq would recognize the existing 
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borders between the two states.
89
 Nevertheless, the demarcation of the borderline remained 
in a state of deadlock. 
 
3.4 - The Boundary Dispute under Abdulkareem Qasim 
On 14 July 1958, a group of devoted Iraqi army officers dethroned the monarchy in 
a bloody coup. King Faisal the Second and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were both killed. 
With the new ruling regime in Iraq, Kuwait was facing a different ideological prospect 
through the nationalist group that ruled Iraq as well as the new situation where British 
influence had faded in Iraq. The new nationalist revolutionists promised “a people‟s 
republic”90 and a sole leader had emerged by the name of Abdulkareem Qasim.  
The Kuwaiti ruler wanted to avoid any possible danger and aimed to avoid any 
confrontation with the new government of Iraq in order to preserve the peace and security 
of Kuwait. On 25 July 1958, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem of Kuwait took the initiative of 
visiting Qasim and congratulating him on his presidency.
91
 On 29 October 1960, Kuwait 
sent a letter asking the new ruler of Iraq to demarcate the border and to hold a discussion 
about going on with demarcating the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq as well as forming 
a joint committee to supervise the boundary demarcation according to the 1932 
correspondence.
92
 Another reminding memo was sent a couple of months later to Iraq to 
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hold the demarcation talks about the maritime and land boundaries.
93 
The Iraqi government 
replied in an apology letter to Kuwait stating that Qasim was otherwise occupied and 
referring that the Amir of Kuwait‟s suggestions were still under study.  
On 29 December 1958, Qasim‟s Foreign Minister Hashem Jawad had sent a 
message to Sheikh Abdallah Al-Salim requesting the permission to open an Iraqi consulate 
to watch after their nationals in Kuwait and to have a contact link between the two 
brotherly states, saying that “the Iraqi Republic views that its top responsibility is to 
cooperate with its dear neighbor Kuwait and to establish relations with it on the bases of 
pure friendship and equal fraternal relations.”94 This request is a clear acknowledgment of 
Kuwait‟s independent status. Along with the previous letter, other documents signed by 
Qasim also contained implicit recognition of Kuwait‟s independence.95 Kuwait published 
documents containing correspondences between the two countries which also expressed 
Iraq‟s desire to expand the cooperation between the two countries in cultural and economic 
scopes. Iraq had supported Kuwait, even before independence, to enter into several Arab 
and international organizations.
96
 
Furthermore, Iraq‟s revolutionary government had expressed acceptance of a map 
depicting Iraq‟s water boundary. In 1959, Captain Coucheron-Aamot of the Royal 
Norwegian Navy made a report and a map that nominates the delineation of a median line 
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boundary for Khor Abdullah.
97
 The map was then passed from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to 
the Danish ambassador in Baghdad, which shows the Iraqi government‟s acceptance, up 
until 1960, of the set boundary line. 
It can be said that during the first three years of Qasim‟s revolutionary Iraq, the 
relations between Iraq and Kuwait were calm and cordial. In March of 1961, Iraq had 
extended Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem an invitation to attend the planned inauguration 
ceremonies for the Port of Umm Qasr.  Though Iraq had not asked for the use of Kuwaiti 
territory in this instance, the Kuwaiti Amir, in the name of being a good neighbor, had 
expressed willingness to allow Baghdad to build the port‟s necessary navigation facilities 
within Kuwaiti territory.  
Unfortunately, the Iraqi relations towards Kuwait had changed when Kuwait 
progressed towards independence. In 19 June 1961, Kuwait got its full independence by an 
exchange of notes between the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir William Luce,98 
and the Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem. The correspondence embodied the 
following provisions: 
(a) “The agreement of the 23rd of January 1899 shall be terminated as being 
inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait. 
(b) The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a 
spirit of close friendship. 
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(c) When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters which 
concern them both. 
(d) Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty‘s 
Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such 
assistance.”99 
Although this correspondence ended the 1899 protective agreement between Sheikh 
Mubarak and the British, the latter nevertheless realized that without including guarantees 
for the security of Kuwait in the agreement of 1961, Kuwait‟s sovereignty may be 
threatened – not to mention the vital economic interests of Britain and the West. Britain 
had, up until then, been able to contain the tensions between the two states, but with the end 
of Britain‟s protective rights in both countries, could now come to the forefront. The 
inclusion of provision (d) within the agreement aimed to deter any Iraqi subversive doings. 
The implicit protective essence within the agreement, in tandem with the achievements of 
Kuwait‟s independence, strengthened Kuwait and reduced its vulnerability as a small state.  
At a press conference held on 25 June 1961, Qasim claimed Kuwait as an integral 
part of Iraq. He stated the procedures he intended to take in order to cancel what he 
considered “wrongs introduced in the Kuwaiti independence of 19 June 1961,” contending 
that: 
―The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to 
demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs [to Iraq as part] 
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of the province of Basra…We shall, accordingly, issue a decree appointing the 
Sheikh of Kuwait as qaimmaqam of Kuwait, who will come under the authority of 
the Basra province.‖100 
Qasim‟s intentions became obvious in that he sought domination instead of cooperation. 
Furthermore, reports showed that Qasim‟s troops in the south were getting ready to invade 
their southern neighbor. 101 
The people of Kuwait and their Amir felt disappointment for three years due to 
Baghdad‟s government having given no reason to Kuwaitis to believe that their relation 
was anything less than cooperative. Accordingly, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem submitted a 
request102 for military assistance to her Majesty‟s Government in accordance to the 
correspondence of 19 June 1961.103 Britain responded immediately and sent 7,000 British 
troops who were placed in defensive locations along Kuwait‟s border with Iraq, where they 
were supported by both air and naval forces. 104 
Arab countries reacted fast as well, dismissing the Iraqi claims over Kuwait and 
assuring their support of Kuwait‟s independence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued a 
statement saying that anything affecting Kuwait also affects Saudi Arabia.105 The Saudi 
King also mentioned that the Iraqi ruler‟s behavior was that of a maniac and that most of 
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the Iraqi people did not support his acts. Approximately 150 Saudi Arabian troops were 
sent to protect the junction of Batin with Wadi al-Aujah, the intersection of the Saudi-
Kuwaiti-Iraqi boundary tripoint.106  
Furthermore, Jamal Abdel Nasser refused the annexation and refused the dissipation 
of energy on fraternal struggles. Accordingly, the United Arab Republic (UAR) held a 
position of refusal towards the annexation but welcomed “the logic of comprehensive 
unity.”107 The Arab League was facing a difficult situation where British troops had been 
called onto “Arab soil by an Arab Government…to prevent an inter-Arab conflict.”108 In 
order to face this dilemma, the League agreed to interfere and replace the British troops to 
safeguard the independence of Kuwait, who had been welcomed as a member. During the 
Arab League‟s council meeting on 20 July 1961, the agreed methodology for Kuwait‟s 
admission was as follows: 
“1 (a) The Kuwaiti Government undertakes to ask for the withdrawal of the British 
forces from her territory as soon as possible. 
(b) The Iraqi government pledges not to use force in annexing Kuwait to Iraq. 
(c) Every desire expressed by Kuwait for unity or federation with Arab League 
member states in accordance with the League Charter should be supported. 
2 (a) Kuwait should be welcomed as a member of the Arab League. 
(b) Kuwait should be supported in its application for United Nations membership. 
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3 (a) The Arab countries undertake to render practical assistance for the 
safeguarding of the independence of Kuwait at her request. The council entrusts 
the Secretary-General of the Arab League to take the necessary measures for the 
carrying out of this decision immediately.”109 
The solution of replacing the British troops by forces from the Arab League countries was 
tied with Kuwait‟s admission to the league on that same date as well as the guarantee of the 
future independence of Kuwait. 
The Arab League‟s Military Committee arrived to Kuwait on 8 August 1961 and 
commenced discussions regarding League troops. Kuwait agreed to conform to the Arab 
League Mutual Defense Pact and to assume all costs associated with the troops, except for 
their salaries which would be the duty of each soldier‟s respective country of citizenship.110 
The troops arrived on 16 September 1961 and were placed along the Kuwaiti side of the 
border due to Iraq‟s refusal of the mission.111 The Arab League therefore made a road inside 
Kuwaiti territory which was set within a range of 350 meters to 2 kilometers from Kuwait‟s 
northern borders with Iraq. As a reference from which they moved 350 meters to 2 
kilometers into Kuwaiti territory, the Arab League presumed that the Kuwait-Iraq border 
line was as stated and agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence in 1932.112 
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3.5 - The Capable Role of British Deterrence  
Britain‟s protective assistance and strong ties with Kuwait‟s Sheikhdom played an 
important deterring factor against Iraqi ambitions to annex Kuwait. Kuwait‟s protection 
from any external threats was Britain‟s responsibility. Due to the ties between Kuwait and 
Britain based on the agreement both sides had signed on 19 June 1961, and though Kuwait 
now had control over its own foreign relations, Britain had pledged to support and assist 
Kuwait. It is sufficient here to say that the military aid provided by the British, in line with 
the abovementioned agreement, prevented Qasim from attacking Kuwait.  
Another factor that played a role in preventing Iraqi domination over Kuwait was 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‟s defensive position – due to its close ties and proximity to 
Kuwait, Riyadh naturally pegged its security in tandem with Kuwait‟s. Saudi Arabia 
considered that any hostility directed towards Kuwait would also affect Saudi Arabia. This 
natural alliance highlighted Kuwait‟s strategic security position in the Gulf. 
Last but not least, Jamal Abdel Nasser, one of the most influential and charismatic 
leaders at that time, rejected the annexation concept to unite the Arab world and stood 
against the Iraqi regime‟s act. He considered this act wasteful of the Arab energies within a 
fraternal struggle. His position gave momentum to the Arab world‟s position in supporting 
this cause. 
Internally, Qasim‟s attitude faced opposition by the Kuwaiti people. Kuwait had 
become more self-reliant of its regional and international standing. Kuwait took the liability 
of developing its relations with Arab states and its larger neighbors. In 1960, Kuwait and 
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Saudi Arabia agreed to appoint a joint boundary demarcation commission, where there was 
readiness to undertake a similar agreement with Iran in regards to their shared maritime 
boundaries.113  Furthermore, Kuwait was investing in promoting its relations both 
economically and politically with its regional Arab sphere as well as with the international 
community. This served to bolster Kuwait‟s importance in the global arena. 
 
3.6 - Qasim’s Attempt to Annex Kuwait: Underlying Causes 
Many drives fed Qasim‟s attempt at annexing Kuwait, which will be discussed 
below. Fortunately for Kuwait, Qasim‟s objective did not crystallize as Qasim‟s troops 
ultimately did not advance onto Kuwaiti territory. 
Firstly, Qasim sought to achieve economic gains with his planned annexation of 
Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait‟s abundance of oil wealth made the sheikhdom an attractive 
target for Qasim and his military regime. By 1960, Kuwait was the world‟s third-largest 
exporter of oil. 
Secondly, it can be said that Qasim was attempting to ease his problem with 
maintaining Iraq‟s internal stability through rallying domestic support for a foreign 
adventure. Although Qasim had a supportive military force capable of launching an attack 
on Kuwait, issues such as unstable border relations with Turkey, Syria and Iran also stood 
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in the way of such an adventure.114 Nevertheless, had such an event been realized, it would 
have undoubtedly provoked hostility towards Iraq by its neighbors. 
Lastly, Iraq wanted an extra outlet into Gulf waters in order to improve its access to 
the sea so as to gain control over the navigational passageways leading to Khor al-Zubair. 
Under Qasim, Iraq strove to construct a port at Umm Qasr where, in 1961, the initial 
foundation stone was placed, giving rise to the modern Iraqi port.  
 
3.7 - Kuwait-Iraq Relations under Abdulsalam Arif’s Rule  
The Arab League‟s peace-keeping forces withdrew from Kuwait on 20 February 
1963 a few days after the Iraqi revolution of 8 February 1963 which saw the overthrow of 
General Qasim. Abdulsalam Arif came to power leading the new government of Iraq. 
Subsequently, the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq became more stable. Although 
Kuwait welcomed the overthrow of Qasim, there was no immediate sign that Kuwait‟s 
boundary problem with Iraq had subsided. 
The Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah had promptly sent a 
congratulatory telegram to the new president of Iraq. In return, President Abdulsalam Arif 
courteously acknowledged the Amir‟s telegram in a friendly manner. 
In the same year, Kuwait was admitted to the United Nations. The U.N. Security 
Council (UNSC) unanimously accepted Kuwait‟s application on 7 May 1963, making 
Kuwait the 111th member of the United Nations General Assembly.115 
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On 4 October 1963, a treaty between Kuwait and Iraq was signed in Baghdad 
whereby Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of Kuwait. The 
Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related 
Matters (hereafter the 1963 Agreed Minutes) confirmed the boundary delimitation as 
specified in the 1932 exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Iraq and the ruler of 
Kuwait. This document was signed by Kuwait‟s crown prince at the time Sheikh Sabah Al-
Salem Al-Sabah and the Prime Minister of Iraq Major-General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr. The 
agreed minutes stated the following: 
―(1) The Republic of Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of 
the State of Kuwait and its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime 
Minister of Iraq dated 21.07.1932 and which was accepted by the ruler of 
Kuwait in his letter dated 10.8.1932 
(2) The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations 
subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty, 
common interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity 
(3) The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and 
economic co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical 
information 
(4) In order to realize all the foregoing objectives, they shall immediately establish 
diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassadors.‖116  
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Accordingly, diplomatic relations were established, ambassadors of the two countries were 
exchanged, and the agreement was registered in the United Nations as well as with the Arab 
League.
117
  
Within the same month in 1963, Kuwait had extended a 25-year interest-free loan to 
Iraq. The actual figure of this loan is 30 million Iraqi Dinars, which was equal to 
approximately $85 million.
118
 Today, the inflation-adjusted value of the $85 million is 
$612.84 million.
119
  
With the departure of the Arab League peace-keeping forces and after Abdulsalam‟s 
revolution, the sandy road within relative proximity to the border was left behind and was 
utilized for two decades afterwards. Consequently, a de facto boundary had come into 
existence a short distance from the accepted interpretation of the 1932 correspondence.  
In the following years, the relations between the two countries blossomed, 
particularly on the economic front. Many economic agreements were concluded between 
the two nations. During this time, Iraq had greatly benefited from loans and money grants 
offered by Kuwait. 
Additionally, talks between the two countries took place in order to officially 
demarcate the border line. Iraq tended to procrastinate on the boundary demarcation 
process with excuses being made to delay the process and to pressure Kuwait into 
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extending additional loans and grants. The talks spanned between 1964 and 1967 where 
Iraq showed reluctance in regards to completing the demarcation task under the pretext of 
not having an available technical committee and in addition to the unavailability of a 
reliable survey map.  
In 1966, Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, visited Baghdad to ease the 
processing for the demarcation of the boundaries. A joint technical committee was set up 
for this purpose. Nevertheless, the committee floundered. Another effort to jumpstart the 
process was to permit Iraqi surveying teams to enter Kuwait; however Iraq once again 
refused to conduct a joint survey. They had based their refusal on the grounds that the Iraqi 
Prime Minister‟s letter approved by the ruler of Kuwait was ambiguous. 
Several subsequent meetings and discussions took place between Kuwait and Iraq. 
It became apparent to the Kuwaiti delegation that Iraq did not want to follow the 
demarcation line as it was stated in the 1932 correspondence. They wanted to cross the 
border line in two areas: Safwan and al-Batin.
120
 It was clear to Kuwait‟s delegates that any 
demarcation approvals done without matching the region specified in the 1932 
correspondence would amount to backing down from a crucial international agreement. 
A cursory glance at the historical narrative reveals that whenever Iraq was in need 
of extra loans, it would once again raise the border issue.
121
 In 1967, Kuwait had presented 
Iraq with a sizeable loan towards financing the electrification of the Samaraa Dam project. 
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Only then did Iraq resume the boundary talks but the follow-ups of that stage were marked 
by wanton delays. 
Iraq was not satisfied with just impeding the border demarcation process; it had also 
performed a series of infringements against the process.
122
 Near the end of 1971 when 
Kuwait refused to provide Iraq with a loan, a new Iraqi aggression followed in March of 
1973, sparking the al-Samita border post crisis. 
 
3.8 - The al-Samita Crisis of 1973  
In March of 1973, Iraq attacked border posts in the northern corner of Kuwait, one 
of which was located in the al-Samita area just south of the Arab League line.
123
 During the 
time of the al-Samita attack, it was reported that some 3,000 troops from Iraq were placed 
within Kuwaiti territory to the south of Umm Qasr.
124
 Iraq‟s justification of launching an 
attack on its neighbor was that their port at Umm Qasr required a transit point within 
Kuwaiti territory. This territory was at al-Samita.
125
 The attack resulted in the deaths of two 
Kuwaiti frontier guards. 
Iraq‟s hostile act resulted in a Kuwaiti angry public reaction together with a similar 
reaction within the greater Arabian Peninsula. Additionally, Iran and Saudi Arabia had 
pledged that should Iraq further intrude into Kuwaiti territory, they would deliver military 
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support to Kuwait.
126
 The Soviet Union also advised Iraq to amicably resolve its border 
issue with Kuwait.
127
 With the mediation of the Arab League, Iraq promised to withdraw 
from the locations in al-Samita; however, Iraq only satisfied this promise after receiving a 
hefty loan from Kuwait. 
This incident affected the territorial consciousness of both the Kuwaiti government 
and its people. Kuwait thus became more keen and cautious of protecting the sovereignty of 
its northern territorial marks along with the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Kuwaitis alike 
actively took part in this by naming their businesses and ships names which include the 
terms „Warbah‟ and „Bubiyan.‟ More movements within Kuwait occurred, reinforcing its 
sovereignty over all of its territory. It became increasingly difficult for Kuwait to cede or 
even lease its islands.  
In July 1975, Kuwait‟s National Assembly adopted a resolution affirming 
“Kuwait‟s sovereignty over all the islands within her borders as specified in international 
agreements.”128 At the same time, Kuwaiti officials were willing to engage in cooperation 
with Iraq while providing them with economic assistance towards developing the frontier 
regions on both sides of the border.
129
 
 
3.9 - Motives for Iraq’s Actions  
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Iraq wanted extra access to the Gulf, a motive which entailed controlling the 
Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. This stratagem would effectively triple Iraq‟s 
shoreline along the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Iraq presumed that, as a result of such gains, it 
could improve the Umm Qasr port and increase its facilities in the Gulf exponentially.  
Due to the Shatt al-Arab dispute between Iraq and Iran and the tense relations 
between the two states, especially with Iran challenging its power, Iraq knew it could face a 
problem. So instead, Iraq kept its territorial encroachments aimed mainly at Kuwaiti 
territory. 
In order for Iraq to assert its authority, it desired to build military bases to be able to 
exercise operational military access in the northern zones of Kuwaiti territory, including the 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. This Iraqi appetite increased especially after the official 
end of British protection in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf littoral in 1968.  
Iraq seemed envious of its neighbor‟s capital reserves, especially since Kuwait had 
been investing these reserves. It is noteworthy, however, that as of January 2010, Iraq‟s oil 
reserves rank fourth, just after Iran, Canada, and Saudi Arabia. It holds oil reserves 
exceeding those of Kuwait by more than 10%.
130
 
 
3.10 - The Rise of Saddam and the Outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War  
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Despite Iraq‟s troublesome relations with Kuwait since Iraq‟s independence, and 
despite the accelerating hostility towards Kuwait, particularly under Abdulkareem Qasim‟s 
regime and the crisis of 1961, Kuwait hoped that Qasim‟s fall would entail a fresh start for 
relations between the two countries. Kuwait had hoped to start cooperative relations both 
economically and culturally, aimed at bettering the neighborhood. This was not to be the 
case under Arif‟s regime, however, particularly with Saddam Hussein in the position of 
deputy Prime Minister who, “according to documents, was [the] mastermind” behind the 
al-Samita incident.
131
  
After the al-Samita aggression, numerous peacemaking statements from Baghdad 
soothed the Kuwait-Iraq relations to a state of détente. Also, the Iraqi forces that had been 
stationed on Kuwaiti land since 1969
132
 had finally withdrawn in 1977, yet only to the Arab 
League Line,
133
 which was still well within Kuwaiti territory
134
 – that is, except for the 
troops positioned in the zone south of Umm Qasr, who not only remained within the 
expanded Iraqi settlement, but also were increasingly eating into Kuwaiti land.
135
 The 
series of infiltrations by Iraqi troops into Kuwaiti territory thus persisted, along with their 
attempts to station within the Kuwaiti boundary.  
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The Ba‟athist regime and Saddam Hussein ultimately came to be the dominant force 
in Iraq, and in July of 1979, Saddam became Iraq‟s president through an intra-party coup. 
The demarcation of the boundary line now seemed hopeless, particularly with the Iraqi 
government‟s insistence on control over Kuwait‟s northern zone and its islands of Warbah 
and Bubiyan. Kuwait was not going to accept these Iraqi demands and in no way planned to 
cede any part of its territory to Iraq. Nevertheless, Kuwait held agreements with Iraq in 
November of 1979 which culminated in the securing of Iraq‟s access to the deep water 
facilities at Mina Shuwaikh for transshipment reasons in May of 1980.
136
 
Soon after, the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war took place and Kuwait supported Iraq 
through the eight years of war that ensued, during which the border issue subsided. Kuwaiti 
assistance to its northern neighbor was largely in the form of logistical and financial 
support, providing zero-interest loans and grants adding up to $10 billion.
137
 This was 
obtained through the sale and production of 125,000 barrels of Kuwaiti oil, daily.
138
 
Furthermore, transshipment facilities through Kuwaiti Mina Shuwaikh were kept open 
throughout the war for the Iraqi government.
139
 Additionally, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
together were providing Iraq with 330,000 barrels of crude oil per day for sale to Iraqi 
customers.
140
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By 1987, Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia, had given Iraq approximately $50 
billion. In addition to granting Iraq free access to Kuwaiti ports, Kuwait allowed Iraqi 
supply trucks to go from Kuwait‟s southern ports northward and across its desert.141 
Through these actions, Kuwait had unequivocally expressed its support to Iraq as a 
fraternal neighbor state. 
As the conflict began to wind down, Iraq persisted in its calls for Kuwait to lease 
the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan in order for it to build a military base. Kuwait received 
threats from Iran warning it not to do so. Hence, Kuwait refused the Iraqi demand and took 
strategic steps to reinforce the physical existence of Kuwait‟s own forces. It aimed at 
establishing infrastructure to connect the islands to the Kuwaiti mainland in Sabiyah. This 
action was taken after the Iranian Foreign Minister had announced that Kuwait would be 
dragged into the war if it were to agree to “granting Iraq Naval facilities on the islands.”142 
Kuwait greatly helped Iraq but it could not compromise its sovereignty and 
existence. Still, the Iraqi government was seeking more of Kuwait. 
 
3.11 - The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
For all Kuwaitis, the day of 2 August 1990 was a day not to be soon forgotten as 
their northern neighbor embarked upon an unprecedented invasion into Kuwaiti territory.  
Kuwait had previously helped Iraq and had stood beside Iraq on many occasions. Iraq‟s 
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ingratitude was evident in its blatant violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, aiming to annex the 
country and incorporate it into Iraqi territory.  
Kuwait had hoped that the relations between the two countries would start a new 
fraternal phase initiated by the prospective settlement of the border issue. Unfortunately, 
the Iraqi government refused to demarcate the border, stonewalling the issue by placing 
untenable demands and conditions in addition to heavy accusations and threats. Saddam 
Hussein had accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of depressing oil prices via the 
overproduction of oil.
143
 He made explicit accusations at the extraordinary Baghdad 
Summit of the Arab League in May 1990, castigating Kuwait for depressing oil prices by 
overproducing oil and exceeding the oil production quotas set by OPEC.  
Saddam also accused Kuwait of extracting oil from the Rumaila oil field, which is 
located in the southern Iraqi territory.
144
 The massive Rumaila oil field is located 
approximately 32 kilometers north of the Kuwait-Iraq border and was discovered with the 
assistance of British Petroleum (BP) in 1953.
145
 Iraq was demanding that Kuwait return all 
the portions of Rumaila oil field, accusing Kuwait of slant-drilling through its Ratga oil 
field. Ratga is a small oil field located within the northern Kuwaiti boundary. Though many 
opinions arose regarding the relation between the Rumaila oil field and Ratga oil field, 
respectable geological analysis done by a Lebanese geologist states that the two fields, 
though of close proximity to one another, are not connected, and that the Rumaila oil field 
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does not “straddle the international boundary.”146 It was also proven that the enormous 
Rumaila oil field consisted of two sections – North Rumaila and Rumaila – where both 
portions lie completely within the Iraqi border. Ratga oil field, on the other hand, was 
discovered 25 years after the discovery of the Rumaila oil field and lies completely within 
Kuwaiti territory. 
In September of 1990, the Kuwaiti Minster of Oil Sheikh Ali Khalifah Al-Sabah 
commented to the Sharq al-Awsat newspaper that the State of Kuwait had been producing 
oil from the Ratga oil field since the 1970s. Since the Ratga oil field had been in production 
for over a decade,  Kuwait was naturally blindsided by Iraq‟s claims. 
Kuwait had suggested that in order to solve the problem of the oil field and the 
accusations surrounding its territorial limits, the border issue should be placed before an 
impartial Arab arbitration tribunal who would “decide on the question of demarcation on 
the basis of standing agreements and documents between Kuwait and Iraq.”147 Saddam‟s 
government did not respond regarding the suggestion. Instead, they set their demands in a 
government statement on 27 July 1990 demanding the „remittance‟ of $2.4 billion for oil 
which Iraq presumed Kuwait had taken from the Rumaila oil field. The statement also 
demanded the handing over of the Ratga oil field to Iraq and the writing-off of all Iraqi debt 
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taken during its war with Iran.
148
 Bundled in with all of these demands was also an implicit 
mention of a desire to control the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan.
149
 
Since Kuwait had always granted Iraq financial support, Kuwait could reconcile 
itself with the financial demands of Iraq. However, Kuwait could not compromise its 
territorial integrity by relinquishing any part of its soil. 
The intentions of Iraq were clear as 100,000 Iraqi troops were mobilized along 
Kuwait‟s frontier. In the early hours of 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait with the aim of 
taking over the whole of Kuwait and integrating it into Iraq. The Iraqi army aimed at 
inflicting chaos and destruction everywhere in Kuwait. They subjected Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals to torture, humiliation and even murder. 
The world sided with Kuwait and refused to accept the barbaric invasion of the 
small peaceful State of Kuwait. The armies of 32 countries got together, forming a joint 
coalition force led by the United States.
150
 This notion was supported by the “international 
legality” of UN Security Council resolutions.151 Since Iraq‟s actions were threatening the 
peace and security of Kuwait and its surrounding nations, the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions were, from the start, filed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.  
 
3.12 - Remarks Regarding Saddam’s Invasion of Kuwait 
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With the long eight-year war, Saddam was still not able to make any progress on the 
Shatt Al-Arab issue. Saddam wanted to build a charismatic invulnerable image for himself 
in the eyes of his people. It can be inferred, then, that in order to prove that he is not subject 
to loss, he turned his attention towards annexing Kuwait.  
The Iraq-Iran war had ended with no real winners. During those eight years of war, 
Saddam had developed a large army that was heavily trained and modernized. However, 
Iraq‟s economy was in shambles and Saddam feared the prospect of internal strife. Saddam 
felt it appropriate to rally nationalist sentiment around the army in another military venture 
– this time in Kuwait. 
Iraq exhibited its greediness by initially claiming that the billions of dollars‟ worth 
of loans received from Kuwait during the 1980‟s were „nonrefundable war premiums‟ and 
that they should be written off. With Iraq‟s additional demand that Kuwait cede its Ratga 
oil field, it was evident that Iraq had its sights set on Kuwait‟s economic wealth and 
abundance of oil fields.  
Since Qasim‟s time, Iraq had expressed its eagerness to gain more access to Gulf 
waters and to improve its ports. It was clear that Kuwait would serve as a strategic location 
for facilitating Iraq‟s maritime clout by increasing its shoreline on the Arabian (Persian) 
Gulf.  
Situated atop the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, Kuwait sits in a geopolitically strategic 
location. Iraq evidently saw that it could benefit from Kuwait‟s physical territory, both 
economically and militarily. In its relations with Kuwait prior to the invasion, Iraq had 
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always pressed that military bases be placed along the northern Kuwaiti territory as well as 
on the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DURING AND AFTER 
GULF WAR I: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE 
 
In the dark hours of 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein took the international 
community by surprise by launching a war against an otherwise pacific Kuwait. Kuwait 
was especially caught off guard, as evidence by the final broadcast from Radio Kuwait on 2 
August 1990 which called for help from the Arab community, pleading for them to “rush to 
[their] help.”152 Furthermore, Washington‟s Kuwaiti ambassador Sheikh Saud Nassir Al-
Sabah appealed to the international community to come to the aid of Kuwait militarily.
153
 
The international community promptly reacted. 
President George Bush Sr. demanded the unconditional and immediate withdrawal 
of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council met in an emergency 
session within hours of the invasion and issued Resolution 660 (1990), demanding that Iraq 
withdraw its forces from Kuwait. The Security Council approved the resolution by a vote of 
14-0, with Yemen abstaining. The Security Council determined the breech of international 
peace and security and, acting under Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
154
 expressed their condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
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demanded that Iraq immediately withdraw from its advance. Articles 39 and 40 of the 
Charter of the United Nations state the following: 
 
―Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council 
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided 
for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be 
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The 
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional 
measures.‖155 
 
During the course of the seven-month invasion, the United Nations Security 
Council had issued 13 resolutions on the matter (Resolution 662, 664, 665, 667, 669, 670, 
674, and 677)
156
 while Saddam‟s regime carried on with its bellicose intransigence. 
Furthermore, Resolution 661 (1990) imposed economic sanctions on Iraq; and Resolution 
678 (1990) authorized Member States supporting Kuwait to use force against Iraq to 
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“uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area"
157
 unless Iraq fully implements the above-
mentioned resolutions on or before 15 January 1991. 
Iraq‟s intransigence to the Security Council‟s demands and requests led to greater 
action on the part of the international community. On 16 January 1991, aerial bombardment 
was launched as the beginning efforts to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory. What 
was called Operation Desert Storm was conducted in accordance with UNSC Resolution 
678, which gave the coalition forces the authority to use “all necessary means to uphold 
and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.”158 These aerial attacks were followed by a 
ground offensive on 24 February 1991. By 28 February 1991, all Iraqi forces had vacated 
Kuwaiti territory and Kuwait City had been liberated.
159
 
The next resolutions issued by the Security Council concerning the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait were Resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) subsequent to the coalition‟s military 
action. Although Kuwait had been liberated, the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council prior to that in response to the Iraqi invasion were not implemented by the Iraqi 
government. As a consequence, Resolution 687 (1991) was issued and adopted on 3 April 
1991 by the Security Council. 
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4.1 - UNSC Resolution 686 (1991)   
On 2 March 1991, U.N. Security Council Resolution 686 was adopted by the 
Security Council. It was the first resolution issued by the UNSC after the Iraqi troops‟ 
withdrawal from Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 686 takes note of the letters addressed to the 
president of the Security Council and to the secretary general from both the deputy prime 
minister and the minister of foreign affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 which confirmed 
Iraq‟s agreement to fully comply with the resolutions issued during the invasion.160 The 
resolution underlines “the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would 
permit a definitive end to the hostility” and affirms all Member States‟ commitments to the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait and Iraq.
161
  
Resolution 686 confirms the necessity of taking measures that would put an end to 
the Iraqi aggression towards its neighbor. It also confirms Iraq‟s need to cease violating 
Kuwait‟s rights, whether territorial, humanitarian, environmental or economical, and that it 
would abide by and acknowledge the definitive territorial integrity of the State of Kuwait. 
 
4.2 - UNSC Resolution 687 (1991)  
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The ceasefire conditions had been set by the U.N. Security Council on 3 April 1991 
and were adopted by Resolution 687. Dubbed the “mother of all resolutions”162 due to its 
length and thoroughness, Resolution 687 contained 34 operative paragraphs divided into 
nine subsections. It addressed issues concerning the demarcation and boundary settlement 
between Iraq and Kuwait, including: the demilitarization of a zone set five kilometers 
within Kuwaiti territory and ten kilometers within Iraqi territory; the destruction and 
restriction of owning and developing any weapons of mass destruction (whether biological, 
nuclear or chemical); returning all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq; Iraq‟s liability under 
international law to the losses (including environmental damage and the depletion of 
natural resources) incurred during Iraq‟s occupation of Kuwait and the creation of a 
compensation fund; the oil and arms embargoes and sanctions against exports to Iraq; 
repatriation for all Kuwaitis and third-state nationals; the requirement placed on Iraq that it 
will not commit or support any acts of international terrorism; and lastly, tying the official 
ceasefire to Iraq‟s acceptance of the abovementioned provisions.  
Concerning the demarcation clause stipulated in Resolution 687, the resolution 
robustly welcomed “the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government.”163 It then affirmed “the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of Kuwait and Iraq…” and noted that: 
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―…Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 
October 1963 ‗Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of 
Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related 
Matters‘, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and 
the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which 
Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait 
within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of 
Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 
10 August 1932.‖ 
Finally, the resolution was conscious “of the need for demarcation of the said boundary.”164 
Like all previous resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 
since 2 August 1990, the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter to bolster Resolution 687. It set out various measures in response to threats to 
peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression such as the imposition of sanctions and the 
use of military force. In its first subsection, Resolution 687 addressed the boundary issue 
within three operative paragraphs. It first demanded that: 
―Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the 
allocation of islands set out in the ‗Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait 
and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly relations, 
recognition and related Matters‘, signed by them in the exercise of their 
                                                          
164
 Ibid., 
 68 
 
sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United 
Nations.‖ 
Secondly, it called upon: 
―The Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and 
Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on 
appropriate material, including the maps transmitted with the letter dated 28 
March 1991 addressed to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, and to report back to 
the Council within one month,‖ 
And thirdly, it decided to: 
―guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take, as 
appropriate, all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.‖165 
On 4 April 1991, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Kuwait‟s Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister at the time, promptly made clear Kuwait‟s acceptance 
to the adoption of Resolution 687. Al-Sabah also stated in his letter addressed to U.N. 
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar that Kuwait was thoroughly taking on the 
resolution‟s provisions and was cooperating with the secretary general to ensure the 
resolution‟s successful implementation.166  
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Furthermore, in a letter addressed to both the U.N. Secretary-General and the 
Security Council President sent by Iraq‟s Foreign Minister Ahmad Husain on 6 April 1991, 
Iraq accepted the terms stated in Resolution 687. Nevertheless, Security Council President 
Paul Noterdaeme sent a letter to Iraq‟s Permanent Representative to the U.N. that Iraq‟s 
acceptance of the resolution was “irrevocable and unqualified.”167 This meant that Iraq had 
formally bound itself for the third time to recognize the border line between Kuwait and 
itself as stated in the Agreed Minutes of 1963.
168
  
Following Resolution 687‟s mandates, the Security Council established many 
subsequent missions and commissions. On 18 April 1991, the United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) was established for the purpose of implementing Resolution 
687‟s provisions relating to nuclear weapons, conducting inspections on the presence of 
biological and chemical weapons, and destroying any weapons of mass destruction.
169
 On 9 
April 1991, the Security Council established the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Mission (UNIKOM) with the expressed purpose of monitoring a demilitarized zone along 
with the Khor „Abd Allah waterway. UNIKOM‟s objective was in deterring boundary 
violations and observing any potential hostile activities from one country‟s territory to 
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another.
170
 Also pursuant to Resolution 687‟s mandates, a United Nations Compensation 
Commission was established on 20 May 1991
171
 with the task of administering a fund to 
compensate for the damages, losses and injuries caused by the Iraqi invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait to Kuwaiti nationals, corporations and foreign governments.
172
 On 2 
May 1991, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission 
(UNIKBDC) was established for the purpose of demarcating the international boundary 
between Kuwait and Iraq and setting the exact geographic coordinates as stated in the 
Agreed Minutes of 1963.
173
 These minutes state the boundary delimitation as mentioned in 
the 1932 correspondence
174
 as being: 
―From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards 
along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards 
passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and 
so on to the junction of the Khor Zubeir with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of 
Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and 
Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Kuwait.‖175 
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Since April of 1991, this definition of the border had been referred to by the United Nations 
as the “delimitation formula.”176 
 
4.3 - The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission  
The formation of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission (UNIKBDC) occurred on 2 May 1991 where Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar presented a report relating to the establishment of the Commission. He mentions 
the following, inter alia: 
―I will now establish an Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, to be 
composed of one representative each of Iraq and Kuwait and three independent 
experts who will be appointed by me, one of whom will serve as Chairman… 
The terms of reference of the Commission will be to demarcate in geographical 
coordinates of latitude and longitude the international boundary set out in the 
(1963) Agreed Minutes between Kuwait and Iraq… 
[T]he Commission will also make arrangements for the physical representation of 
the boundary. 
The coordinates established by the Commission will constitute the final 
demarcation of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance 
with the Agreed Minutes of 4 October 1963. 
                                                          
176
 Ibid., 
 72 
 
The demarcation of the boundary will be accomplished by drawing upon 
appropriate material…and by utilizing appropriate technology. 
[A]ll costs…should be shared between the two interested parties. 
The Commission will take its decisions by majority. Its decisions regarding the 
demarcation of the boundary will be final.‖177 
The members of the Commission were named by the U.N. secretary general. 
Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, who was formerly the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was named 
Chairman of the Commission.
178
 Two other Swedish and New Zealand experts were chosen 
as members of the Commission – Ian Brook and William Robertson, respectively.179 The 
governments of both Kuwait and Iraq were asked to nominate representatives of their states 
to be members of the commission, whereby Ambassador Tarek A. Razzouki was 
nominated by Kuwait and Ambassador Riyad Al-Qaysi was nominated by Iraq.
180
 However 
on 20 November 1992, Chairman Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja resigned and the U.N. 
secretary general appointed Nicolas Valticos, former Assistant Director-General of the 
International Labor Office and member of the Institute of International Law, as the new 
Chairman on the same day.
181
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The Commission‟s initial meeting was held on 23 May 1991 in New York where 
the members first decided on the procedural aspects of the demarcation process and 
discussed issues such as the nature of their work, its schedule, the required materials to 
undertake the demarcation process, the requirement of conducting on-site visits, and also 
the possibility of seeking expert participation from both countries.
182
 Subsequently, 
between 15-19 June 1991, the Commission took an inspection tour of the border zone and 
also sought assistance from a surveying team which was assigned the task of remapping 
and surveying the border area.
183  
Throughout the course of their work, the Commission members held 82 meetings 
during 11 sessions.
184
 At the end of their fifth session, UNIKBDC issued a press release 
announcing the decisions it had reached regarding the land boundary between Kuwait and 
Iraq.
185
 The main points stated in the report, dated 16 April 1992, were as follows: 
―…adhering to the delimitation formula, and based on the findings of the 
independent experts and the deliberations of the Commission, the Commission has 
reached the following decisions on the boundary by voting, with Iraq not 
participating in the vote: 
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1. That the boundary monument on the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border, Pillar No.1, 
shall be the starting point for the boundary along the thalweg of Wadi Al Batin, 
and therefore, the tripoint of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 
2. That the boundary south of Safwan shall be located at the distance of 1430 
metres from the south-west of the compound wall of the old customs post along 
the old road from Safwan to Kuwait; 
3. That the boundary at the northern end of Wadi Al Batin shall be the intersection 
of the thwaleg of the Wadi and the latitude of the point south of Safwan; 
4. That the boundary south of Umm Qasr shall coincide with the location at which 
the boundary line on map sheet 5549-I of series K7611, edition 2 (1990), 
produced by the Military Survey of the United Kingdom, crosses the western 
shore of Khowr Zhobeir; and 
5. That the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah shall be the one best 
identified for the Epoch 1932 and transposed onto modern orthophoto maps 
produced by the Commission.‖ 
The Commission has further decided that: 
‖(A) The boundary line in the Wadi Al Batin shall be  a series of straight line 
segments of about two kilometres length best approximating to the lowest point line 
with the Wadi; 
(B) The boundary line from the point of the northern end of Wadi Al Batin to the 
point south of Safwan shall be a line running along the common latitude of the 
points; 
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(C) The boundary line from the point south of Safwan to the point south of Umm 
Qasr shall be the shortest line between the points; and that 
(D) The boundary line from the point south of Umm Qasr on the shore shall follow 
the low water line up to the location of directly opposite the junction of Khowr 
Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah. 
The Commission has thus been able to draw the line of the boundary to the best of 
its ability and in light of all available information.‖186 
In line with these stipulations, the Commission attached the following map to the report: 
 
Figure 4: U.N. map showing the land boundary as demarcated by the U.N. boundary Commission
187
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In an flimsy attempt to dissociate itself from the process of demarcation, Iraq, as 
stated within the report, did not partake in the voting process.
188
 The Kuwaiti reaction to the 
steps accomplished thus far by the Commission was positive.
189
 Though Kuwait was 
pleased that it regained its territory with Iraq moving back from the „Arab League Line,‟190 
it was indeed “less than happy” that all of Khor Zubair‟s waters were placed within Iraqi 
territory as the interpretation to the 1932 letter of correspondence to that region implied that 
the territory was divided among the two countries.
191
  
Not surprisingly, none of the UNIKBDC sessions subsequent to 16 April 1992 were 
attended by the Iraqi representative of the Commission, yet copies of all documents issued 
by UNIKBDC were sent to him.
192
 Nevertheless, on 17 June 1992, the President of the 
U.N. Security Council Paul Noterdaeme issued a note, illustrating that: 
“The members of the Council wish to stress to Iraq the inviolability of the 
international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait being demarcated by the 
Commission and guaranteed by the Council pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the 
grave consequences that would ensue from any breach thereof.”193 
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4.4 - UNSC Resolution 773 (1992) and UNIKBDC 
After UNIKBDC had issued its report on 24 July 1992 illustrating the final land 
boundaries adopted by the Commission, the secretary general sent a letter to the president 
of the Council on 12 August 1992 presenting the Commission‟s report.194 Following the 
letter, the Security Council met on 26 August 1992 and issued Resolution 773 (1992). The 
Council emphasized that the Commission has been doing its job at setting the coordinates 
of the boundary between the two states set out in the Agreed Minutes of 1963 and that it 
was not reallocating shares of land from one side of the boundary to the other.
195
 The 
Security Council then welcomed “the Secretary-General‟s letter of 12 August to the 
President of the Council and the further report of the Commission enclosed therewith.” It 
also welcomed: 
―…the decision of the Commission to consider the Eastern section of the boundary, 
which includes the offshore boundary, at its next session and urge[d] the 
Commission to demarcate this part of the boundary as soon as possible and thus 
complete its work.‖ 
Additionally, the Resolution reaffirmed: 
―its guarantee of the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary 
and its decision to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in 
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accordance with the Charter, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 
(1991)‖ 
and further welcomed: 
―the Secretary-General's intention to carry out at the earliest practicable time the 
realignment of the demilitarized zone referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 
(1991) to correspond to the international boundary demarcated by the Commission, 
with the consequent removal of the Iraqi police posts.‖196 
The physical demarcation process of the land boundary set within previous 
UNIKBDC reports
197
 was underway by October 1992. By the end of November 1992, 106 
pillars were placed along the border with a distance of two kilometers from one another, 
starting at the intersection of the Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi boundary tripoint at Wadi al-
Aujah.
198
 During the Commission‟s seventh session of meetings from 12-16 October 1992, 
and especially with Resolution 773 urging the Commission to demarcate the offshore 
boundary between the two countries, maritime boundary demarcation was at the top of the 
agenda.
199
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Following UNIKBDC‟s ninth session of meetings held between 15-18 March 1993, a 
“median line delimitation” was reached for the maritime boundary.200 This final eastern 
segment between Kuwait and Iraq, previously untackled by the Commission, was the 
section from the junction of Khor Zubair and Khor Abd Allah to the point where Khor Abd 
Allah meets the Arabian (Persian) Gulf waters. UNIKBDC had chosen to set “the 
demarcation of the boundary along the median line in Khor Shetana and Khowr Abd 
Allah”, where their set geographical coordinates define the median line starting “from a 
point nearest to the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr Abd Allah..[and reaching] a 
point at the eastern end of the Khowr Abd Allah where there is a marked change in the 
general direction of the coast.”201 
The map below was issued accordingly: 
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Figure 5: Map showing the U.N. delimitation of the Iraq/Kuwait maritime boundary
202
 
 
The Commission based their placement of the median line on two criteria. Firstly, 
they considered a report done by Coucheron-Aamot, a Norwegian hydrographer, in 1959 
delineating a median line within the maritime area between Kuwait and Iraq as a reference, 
especially since that report, along with a map attached, had been authenticated by Iraq‟s 
foreign minister at the time.
203
 Secondly, the Commission rationalized that “navigational 
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access should be possible for both states to the various parts of their respective territory 
bordering the demarcated boundary.”204 The Commission also saw that this rationale 
promoted peace, stability and security along the border.
205
 They also noted that “the right of 
navigation and access is provided for under the rules of international law as embodied in 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” which had previously been 
ratified by both Kuwait and Iraq.
206
 
Physical representation of the seaway boundary was thought unnecessary by 
UNIKBDC. Its only representation took place, 
―…during the final field session, [where] a modified pointer pillar was placed on 
line between pillar No. 106 and the low-water springs line. Plaques were emplaced 
on the jetties where the low-water springs line continued beneath them. An offset 
mark was emplaced at the southern end of the stone-faced embankment, south of the 
southernmost jetty. Two pointer poles, which uniquely define the direction between 
the last point on the low-water springs line and the junction of the Khowrs, were 
also emplaced and three witness marks were established nearby.‖207 
The map below was issued accordingly: 
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Figure 6: Map Showing U.N. Demarcation of Khor al-Zubair208  
 
Through this, UNIKBDC had finally set the boundary separating Iraq from Kuwait. 
During their 10th and 11th meeting sessions, the Commission set and approved the final 
coordinates of the international boundary between the two countries. The final report, 
which included the set coordinates along with a map depicting the finalized borders, were 
then submitted to then-Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 20 May 1993. 
                                                          
208
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4.5 - UNSC Resolution 833 (1993) and UNIKBDC 
With UNIKBDC having submitted its final report on 20 May 1993, the U.N. 
Security Council issued Resolution 833 on 27 May 1993. Resolution 833 first reaffirmed 
the prior resolutions issued regarding the boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, 
including Resolutions 687 (1991), 689 (1991), 773 (1992) and 806 (1993).
209
 It then 
recalled the secretary general‟s letter dated 2 May 1991 concerning the establishment of 
UNIKBDC. The Council then considered the secretary general‟s letter dated 21 May 1993 
containing UNIKBDC‟s final report and recalled that the Commission‟s duties were, as 
stated in the letter, technical rather than being political and that the Commission had simply 
demarcated the boundary between the two states without reallocating territory to either 
side. The Council then reminded Iraq of its obligations under Resolutions 687 (1991) and 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council then approved the 
secretary general‟s instructions to UNIKOM to “finalize the realignment of the 
demilitarized zone.”210 The Council then acted under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, where they welcomed the conclusion of and expressed appreciation for the 
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Commission‟s work, and also welcomed its final demarcation decisions.211 The council 
demanded 
that Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with international law and relevant Security 
Council resolutions respect the inviolability of the international boundary, as 
demarcated by the Commission, and the right to navigational access; 
The Council underlined and reaffirmed  
its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international 
boundary which has…been finally demarcated by the Commission and to take as 
appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter, as 
provided for in…resolution 687 (1991) and…resolution 773 (1992).‖212 
UNIKBDC had thus fulfilled its mandate of setting the final internationally-recognized 
boundary, both land and maritime, between Iraq and Kuwait. 
Though Iraq had initially stood against the Commission‟s work, Iraq formally 
expressed its acceptance of the border as set out by the U.N. through the UNIKBDC in 
November of 1994.
213
 By accepting the Commission‟s findings, Iraq had effectively 
relinquished its previous claims over Kuwaiti territory, including its islands.
214
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4.6 - Democratic Iraq and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
Starting with UNSC Resolution 661 (1990), in response to Saddam‟s invasion of 
Kuwait, economic sanctions were placed on Iraq under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
Other sanctions were placed on Iraq under Chapter VII from, including Resolution 687 
relating to weapons of mass destruction; the return of Kuwaiti property; Iraq‟s liability to 
losses incurred during the invasion (which led to the creation of a compensation fund); oil 
and arms embargoes and sanctions against exports to Iraq which were aimed at 
demilitarizing Saddam‟s regime; the commitment of not supporting or committing any acts 
of terrorism; and, lastly, relating to the returning of all Kuwaiti and third-state nationals.
215
  
Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein‟s regime in 2003, the United Nations 
Security Council, along with the so-called ‟coalition of the willing,‟ began a gradual 
easement of Iraq‟s situation. Under UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003), all trade sanctions 
except for the arms embargo were lifted from Iraq – additionally, the now-infamous Oil-
for-Food Program was also terminated.
216
 Since the removal of Saddam, and contingent 
upon Iraq‟s democratic progress, the U.N. had adopted other measures which would enable 
Iraq to exercise control over its own matters. On 15 December 2010, the Security Council 
adopted three resolutions – 1956, 1957 and 1958 – aimed at lifting sanctions against Iraq 
which were imposed through Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Council first decided on 
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terminating the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)
217
 effective June 2011 where the 5% 
deduction in oil revenues would be deposited into the Compensation Fund.
218,
 Furthermore, 
the Council terminated “the weapons of mass destruction, missile, and civil nuclear-
related” sanctions imposed on Iraq.219 
  On 27 September 2010, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated the following: 
―Kuwaiti officials reaffirmed their desire for good relations with Iraq and 
emphasized that the new Government of Iraq should make concrete and tangible 
progress on the ground in finding missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and 
archives.‖220 
He also stated that the issues discussed during a visit by his Special Representative to 
Kuwait in October 2010 were 
―…related to developments in and the way forward on implementation of relevant 
Security Council resolutions pertaining to the normalization of relations between 
Iraq and Kuwait, particularly with respect to border maintenance, compensation 
and missing persons and property.‖221 
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American Vice President Joe Biden, who chaired the U.N. Security Council 
meeting on 15 December 2010, stated that Iraq must quickly meet its remaining obligations 
taken under Chapter VII in regards to the situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait.
222
 Furthermore, Iraq‟s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari stated that his “country is 
committed to fulfill its remaining obligations under relevant Chapter VII Security Council 
resolutions pertaining to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.”223 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
KUWAITI-IRAQI RECONCILIATION POST-SADDAM 
 
The boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait had ultimately been settled at the 
international level through the United Nations. Any Iraqi claims to Kuwait as a whole or 
any part of its territories (land or maritime) had come to an end in 1994 with Iraq‟s formal 
acceptance of the international boundary which separated it from Kuwait as set out by 
UNIKBDC and reflected in Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 773 (1992) and 833 
(1993). With the United States-led  operation
224
 to overthrow Saddam Hussein militarily on 
20 March 2003, along with Iraq‟s formal acceptance of the final settlement of the 
international boundary, a new era had presented itself with the promise of better bilateral 
relations between Iraq and Kuwait.
225
 
Kuwait supported the newly-liberated Iraq and has since been more than 
cooperative with the nascent Republic. Kuwait has made many efforts towards assisting 
Iraq in reaching peace and stability during this critical juncture. Kuwait extended an olive 
branch by, inter alia, constructing a water line from its territory into Iraq. Kuwait has also 
organized a humanitarian operation center where it raised $550 million in assistance to the 
Iraqi people.
226
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Kuwait showed concern for the stability of its neighbor and had participated in 
many regional conferences concerning Iraq‟s stability. Kuwait also hosted such a 
conference for Iraq on 22 April 2008. Prior to the conference in Kuwait, the Iraqi 
government said that this conference would be one of the most critical conferences where 
Iraqi needs would be discussed. Such needs included Iraq‟s relations with neighboring 
countries, its energy supplies, and Iraqi refugees in Jordan.
227
 The conference invited many 
participants, including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, representatives from the 
five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, all members of the GCC, the Arab 
League, the G-8, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and representatives from the 
European Union.
228
  
There is nothing in geopolitics that necessarily dictates inherently conflictual 
relations between Kuwait and Iraq. International relations is replete with examples of large 
states living in harmony with their weaker neighbors.
229
 It can be postulated that past 
conflicts between Kuwait and Iraq had stemmed primarily from societal and regime-type 
variables within Iraq. In its recent history, Iraq had seen the rise and fall of many tyrannical 
rulers whereby the relationship between the government and its citizenry was, at best, 
uneasy. Targeting Kuwait was thus a regime strategy aimed at deflecting attention from 
domestic problems. This flagrant bellicosity also aimed to confiscate Kuwait‟s immense 
wealth vis-à-vis its abundant oil fields.  
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The characteristics of the Iraqi totalitarian regimes that have previously governed 
Iraq have been the source of turbulent relations with Kuwait. It can be argued that Germany 
and France had similar turbulent relations in the past. However, after the end of World War 
II and the fall of the Nazi regime in 1945, the relations between the two countries became 
cooperative and friendly; this blossoming of relations was initiated by the Franco-German 
Friendship which led to the end of hostilities between France and Germany. Many treaties 
were signed during the Cold War whereby Germany protected its national security interests 
through reintegration into Western Europe; meanwhile France targeted its reestablishment 
as a Grande Nation. In 1963, France and Germany signed the Élysée Treaty which 
contained agreements between the countries relating to foreign policy, military and 
economic integration, and academic cooperation. The lesson learned is that by building 
amicable relations, the prospect of any unstable circumstances between two states virtually 
diminishes. Could this be the prospect of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations where the relation 
becomes based on cooperation rather than confrontation? The more democratic Iraq will be, 
the smoother the relations between Kuwait and Iraq will be. 
Kuwait has built ties with the Iraqi government and dominant Iraqi factions. On 18 
July 2008, Kuwait dispatched its first ambassador to Iraq since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Many Iraqi officials were also welcomed to visit Kuwait to build up cooperative 
relations between the two countries. On 12 January 2011, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister 
Sheikh Nasser Mohammed Al-Sabah took the initiative of becoming the first Kuwaiti 
prime minister to visit Iraq since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, where he was welcomed in 
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the airport by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki,
230
  whose first words to him were, 
“Welcome to the New Iraq.”231 Nuri al-Maliki‟s statement a few days before Prime 
Minister Nasser‟s visit to Iraq was appreciated by Kuwaiti leaders where he said that 
“Iraq‟s former ambitions against Kuwait have gone forever and will never return again.”232 
Shortly afterwards, the Iraqi prime minister visited Kuwait on 16 February 2011.
233
 
The Kuwaiti prime minister‟s visit to Iraq was described by the Kuwaiti 
undersecretary of foreign affairs as being “successful in all measures.”234 The Iraqi 
president, in his meeting with the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, stated that Iraq was very keen on 
strengthening its relations with Kuwait through increasing the levels of cooperation and 
organization between the two countries in order to serve the interests of both peoples, 
adding that the two countries “had suffered under a tyrannical dictatorship and its reckless 
wars.”235 The outcomes of this visit were not only cordial and strongly welcoming, but also 
were aimed at the formation of a higher ministerial committee to discuss outstanding issues 
between the two countries according to international legitimacy resolutions. 
In a press conference with Iraq‟s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Kuwait‟s 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah had said that the two 
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countries had agreed to hold regular meetings on the highest of standards to discuss the 
common issues lying between them. Additionally, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
expressed his desire of Iraq to translate its friendly press releases towards Kuwait into 
tangible outcomes and results.
236
  
 
5.1 - Unresolved Issues Related to Iraq’s 1990 Invasion 
Although the relations between the governments of Kuwait and Iraq have seemingly 
improved, there are still lingering issues at the forefront which should be dealt with. It is 
required in this stage to prove Iraq‟s bona-fide intentions towards Kuwait where all the 
remaining issues should be resolved under the umbrella of the U.N. 
Despite the much-heralded progress between the two countries, Kuwait and Iraq 
still need to tackle previously unresolved issues. Regionally, and domestically, this would 
serve for greater peace and security of the region. By the end of Saddam‟s incursion into 
Kuwait, the fate of 605 Kuwaiti and third-state nationals
237
 was unknown and many were 
presumed dead. Of these 605,
238
 369 Kuwaitis and third-state nationals remain unaccounted 
for. To this end, Iraq‟s Ministry of Human Rights, the lead Iraqi agency in charge of 
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determining the fate of these missing persons, received a $1 million grant from Kuwait.
239
 
Another unresolved issue between the two countries is the returning of all Kuwaiti property 
seized by Iraq during the 1990 invasion, namely the Kuwaiti National Archives. 
A third lingering issue between Iraq and Kuwait is the issue between Kuwait 
Airways and Iraq Airways,
240
 where the theft of 10 Kuwaiti aircrafts and spare parts had 
occurred during the Iraqi invasion. The value of the losses incurred, which had been 
recorded with the U.N. Compensation Fund, stands at $1.2 billion. Through judicial 
avenues, Kuwait Airways has obtained court rulings in its favor,
241
 enabling it to take hold 
of Iraq Airways assets with a view towards settling Iraq‟s debt to the Compensation Fund 
for Kuwait Airways if Iraq Airways further abstains from paying its obligations.
242
 
A further issue between the two countries relates to the maintenance of border 
markings and pillars placed along the U.N.-demarcated international border as well as the 
share of costs for such maintenance. Though this issue is still outstanding, in July of 2010 
Kuwait had granted Iraq initial approval by providing it with a special border crossing that 
would ease the international oil companies‟ work within Iraq.243 Additionally, Iraq still 
owes $25 billion to Kuwait through the Compensation Fund.
244
 Further underlying issues 
also remain at the forefront, such as talks from the Iraqi side about the regional water 
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outlets and Iraqi demands to expand its outlet to the Gulf waters for the purpose of 
developing its oil export operations.
245
 There is also the issue of Iraq‟s debt to Kuwait, 
which is estimated at an outstanding $16 billion.
246
 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, during his visit to Kuwait in February of 
2011, said that “the talks encompassed Iraq‟s rights regarding its navigational access 
according to international law and according to the…positive suggestions of our Brothers 
in Kuwait to help Iraq in this aspect.”247 Additionally, the Iraqi prime minister, at the end of 
his visit, affirmed that he “will take all the ideas discussed with him back to Baghdad, be 
them related to the navigation through Khor Abdallah or the debt issue or the maintenance 
of border marking systems, to be built upon by the specialized persons.”248 In all the 
meetings between the two countries, great emphasis has been placed on the importance of 
resolving the residual issues since Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  
The Iraqi prime minister‟s Media Advisor Ali Al-Mousawi stated during the 
Kuwaiti Prime Minister‟s visit to Iraq that “committees will convene very soon to discuss 
possible solutions for the underlying issues with means of dialogue, and that these 
committees will work to reach final solutions for each issue within set legal 
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mechanisms.”249 He further pointed out that “matters which require parliamentary decisions 
will be transferred to the parliaments of the two countries whereas other issues will be 
undertaken by the governments of the two countries.”250 
Furthermore, there are steps which need to be taken by the Iraqi government 
towards solving certain issues such as the issue of the Iraqi farmers who, in 2006, were 
building a 200 kilometer-long pipeline for irrigation purposes within Kuwaiti territory.
251
 
The joint Kuwaiti-Iraqi committee met during February 2011 in regards to this issue, where 
the end result was to establish a wide buffer zone of 500 meters on both sides of the border 
between the two countries and to transfer the farmers to new homes within the Iraqi 
territory. Additionally, a Kuwaiti official stated that Kuwait has pledged, under this 
agreement, to build a maximum of fifty houses for the farmers who have been moved.
252
 
The agreement stipulates that both countries maintain no activity, except for that of the 
border police, within this 500-meter border strip.
253
  
With regards to the compensation of Iraqi citizens whose assets were within 
Kuwaiti territory after the demarcation of the international borders between Iraq and 
Kuwait, and for whom the UN Security Council issued resolution 899 (1994), Secretary-
                                                          
249
 Al-Muhammed fi Baghdad.. ziyarat kasr al-jaleed [Al-Muhammed in Baghdad.. The ice-breaking visit]. 
op.cit, pp. 1, 6-7. 
250
 Ibid., 
251
 Mahmoud, Sh. (2010, November 24). Al-Mubaraki: Itefaq Kuwaiti-Iraqi Li-bina'a ma la Yatajawaz 50 
Manzilan Lil-Muzari'een Li-Naqlihim Ela Kharej al-Hudood [Al-Mubaraki: Kuwaiti-Iraqi Agreement to 
Build no more than 50 Houses for the Farmers to Move Them out of the Border]. Al-Seyassah. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.al-seyassah.com/AtricleView/tabid/59/smid/438/ArticleID/115639/reftab/36/ 
Default.aspx>. 
252
 Ibid., 
253
 Ibid., 
 96 
 
General Ban Ki-moon reminded Iraq, in his third report concerning the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
254
,  that the compensation payments to these Iraqi 
private citizens is still pending. The Iraqi government is still procrastinating the removal of 
past farms along the international border and in paying this compensation which had been 
deposited in an account with the United Nations since 1996.
255
 
Also, within the context of arranging for the implementation of U.N. resolutions lies 
the development of a border post between the two countries.
256
 Nevertheless, a sincere will 
is required for Iraq‟s agreement to go on with the arrangements to complete its 
implementation and execution. 
In regards to the oil fields between the two countries, recent geological evidence 
shows that there exists a giant oil field stretching across the Iraqi-Kuwaiti northern borders, 
where the much larger portion of it lies within Iraqi territory and is referred to as Rumaila; 
the small portion of the oil field which is located within Kuwaiti territory is referred to as 
Ratga.
257
 Kuwait and Iraq have reached an agreement, in principle, to regulate the 
production of the oil fields around the border which have previously been the source of 
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disputes between the two countries.
258
 According to the Kuwaiti minister of oil, this 
agreement was intended to “prevent any future accusations [from either Kuwait or Iraq] 
that one of the two countries is taking advantage of these shared fields.”259  
Although the border was set by the U.N. in 1993 and although Iraq had formally 
accepted its international boundaries and coordinates in 1994, the issue still provokes some 
tensions, particularly as certain Iraqi factions from the Iraqi opposition have released 
provocative statements with the expressed purpose of stirring up the border issue.
260
 Such 
rhetoric could potentially complicate the atmosphere of reconciliation and the cooperative 
efforts of resolving the outstanding issues in addition to undermining the warm relations 
between the two countries.
261
 Within this context, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has 
often called on Iraq‟s government to reaffirm its obligations towards Resolution 833 (1993) 
relating to the maritime boundary between Iraq and Kuwait; the secretary general stressed 
that Iraq meet this issue with “urgent attention” if they desire to be removed from Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter.
262
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5.2 - Strategic Approaches to Enhancing Bilateral Relations 
Philosophical perspectives of international relations often determine the various 
aspects of a country‟s chosen policies. The realist approach for dealings between states 
relies on the building up of military counter-alliances and the balancing of power for the 
sake of deterring any possible hostilities. The liberal approach, however, relies on 
cooperative relations and economic ties which build mutual interests between nations. 
Kuwait has adopted a novel strategy and approach whereby it forms alliances to keep itself 
protected in order to avoid any possible problems which may arise. Due to Kuwait‟s 
positioning in the middle of three comparatively larger states, it had followed a balancing 
policy with its neighbors in order to better maintain its security. Kuwait always sought to 
maintain the general stability within the Gulf region.  
With the changes in the international political sphere and with the current 
international legal environment, small states have enjoyed far greater protection from their 
larger neighbors – in the case of Kuwait, this notion can be exemplified by Saudi Arabia‟s 
unwavering support. International norms have undergone major changes in the last few 
decades. Kuwait is no longer as vulnerable as it used to be; the international community no 
longer tolerates the concept of large states intimidating their smaller neighbors; and Iraq is 
no longer as strong as it used to be. Through its pragmatic policies, Kuwait has effectively 
enhanced stability in the region. 
Kuwait had previously faced its challenges by implementing policies as a reaction, 
though this proved untenable when it came to major crises. Kuwait is trying to build a new 
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strategic vision within an economic perspective whereby the basic concept consists of 
integrating its neighbors within intertwined economic interests. These integrated purely 
economical interests, when merged with Kuwait‟s basic target of reaching its national 
security in its broader sense, provides the foundation for building an environment of 
durable peace for the greater benefit of Kuwait and all of its neighbors within its regional 
sphere; it then becomes nonsensical for regional neighbors to have precarious relations 
between one another. The economic benefits of Kuwait‟s large-scale developmental 
projects allow it to become a financial, commercial, technological, and services center, as 
well as a center for transportation and communication for its surrounding countries. This 
will not only serve Kuwait but also will serve and focus on the regional countries‟ interests 
whereby benefiting everyone. The regional countries‟ convictions that these benefits will 
serve their respective interests along with their broader national security through their 
political, economical, social, and environmental spectrums will contribute to achieving 
Kuwait‟s aims at creating an environment of peace and regional security. 
With Iraq now shifting towards democracy, Kuwait and the Gulf states have been 
trying to promote better relations with Iraq. Kuwait, in particular, has been a staunch 
supporter of the newly-emergent Iraq, particularly during its transitional period after the fall 
of Saddam Hussein. The requirement for an external enemy no longer exists as it did under 
Iraq‟s dictatorial regimes; shifting Iraq to a democracy alters this concept and makes 
relations more cooperative. It is evident that relations tend to be more peaceful when a 
dictator is absent from the calculus. Nevertheless, in order for Iraq to better integrate itself 
in the neighborhood, Baghdad needs to reassess its previous behavior towards Kuwait in 
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order to become more cooperative, especially since borders have now been fully delineated. 
This should occur not just for the sake of dealing with Kuwait, but so that Kuwait would be 
the portal for Iraq to join its regional sphere through strengthening relations with member 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The current relationship between Iraq and 
Kuwait could indeed be more cooperative; this relationship can help Iraq in many fields 
and may even blossom into a friendship, especially in light of current uneasy relations 
between Iraq and its other neighbors. Kuwait may very possibly be Iraq‟s best neighbor. 
To promote this opportunity positively, Kuwait, through its development plan and 
the implementation of strategic projects, sought that this relationship would benefit not only 
Kuwait but also Iraq and the region as a whole. Kuwait has started the development of 
Bubiyan Island as part of Kuwait‟s development plan. The project of Port Mubarak the 
Great is underway and is to be located on the eastern flank of Bubiyan Island. The strategic 
goal of establishing the port is to create a pivotal port which may support Kuwait‟s plans at 
creating a diverse economic center that actively contributes to the economic advancement 
and development of the region.
263
 The port contains two options for transportation: a road 
for cars and a railway for trains.
264
 It is planned that the port will contain 60 anchorages, 
each with a depth of twenty meters for the purpose of the extensive use of the port and for 
accommodating big ships with large capacities.
265
 The port will not only serve Kuwait, but 
it will also serve the whole region (including Iraq) such that it will connect between the east 
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and the west through the construction of the proposed railroad.
266
 The implementation of 
the railroad will thus connect Kuwait with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey,
267
 with 
prospects of it reaching Central and Eastern Asia.
268
 Furthermore, the port aims to be an 
environmentally-friendly port with respect to its functioning standards.
269
 
The following image describes the works underway on Bubiyan Island: 
 
Figure 7: Map of planned construction on Bubiyan Island
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During the development of this project, the Iraqi frontier was divided on its opinion. 
It witnessed a split of opinions where political escalation on one side was evident on the 
part of writers, the media and businessmen; on the other side, Iraqi political factions and 
diplomatic requests were calling for pacification and political dialogue such that the matter 
be clear from propaganda or fallacies and be viewed and addressed within a technical and 
objective light.
271
 Certain Iraqi media outlets claimed that Port Mubarak the Great affects 
negatively on Iraqi navigational waterways as well as the Iraqi port al-FAO.
272
 This is 
untrue since the distance between the Kuwait port and the maritime navigational 
passageways is 1.5 kilometers. A media source escalated the matter by incorrectly stating 
that Iraqi maritime navigational paths fall within the expected Port of Mubarak the Great 
and also stated that Iraq will resort to the United Nations regarding the matter. 
Kuwait was surprised by these words, especially since the project had been 
underway for a few years. Kuwait viewed the antagonistic position as “an unsuccessful 
hasty move.”273 Kuwaiti diplomatic sources also mentioned that such attitudes were false 
allegations not pertaining to reality and that, with reference to Resolution 833 (1993), 
Kuwait is committed to secure freedom of navigational access for ships and the Iraqi right 
for that passage is guaranteed.
274
 On 16 June 2011, Al-Qabas Newspaper published that the 
Kuwaiti undersecretary of foreign affairs stated that the Port of Mubarak the Great is of far 
distance from the navigational passageways leading to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. He 
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further assured that its anchorages are a kilometer and a half away from the border of the 
navigational channel, which means that Iraq need not to be concerned. The undersecretary 
further illustrated that the Kuwaiti port completely falls within Kuwait‟s territorial 
sovereignty and that the port does not impede navigation in Khor Abdullah. 
Within the same framework, the State of Kuwait welcomed an Iraqi technical team 
in charge of following up and taking all relevant information related to Port of Mubarak the 
Great on Bubiyan Island.
275
 Following from there, the Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait 
expressed his “satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting which is reassuring and very 
thorough with respect to the questions posed by the Iraqi team and the answers given from 
the Kuwaiti side, who were very professional, skilled and accurate.”276 The Iraqi technical 
team was taken on a field visit to the location of the Kuwaiti port and was also provided 
with a series of maps, documents and satellite images relating to the matter. 
277
 
Though Kuwait desires to promote and enhance relations with Iraq, it is unwilling 
to jeopardize its right towards making its own national and sovereign decisions.  
It is incorrect for any side to curtail the other government‟s role of utilizing its country‟s 
resources; Kuwait should not be curtailed in utilizing its natural and industrial lands 
including Bubiyan Island. Nevertheless, Kuwait sought to further reassure Iraq in 
expressing its readiness to sign a bilateral agreement, assuring its northern neighbor that the 
Port of Mubarak the Great neither obstructs the Iraqi project of the al-FAO Port nor 
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impinge upon Iraqi territorial waters. The Kuwaiti ambassador in Iraq further affirmed, via 
satellite images of the region, that the distance between the Kuwaiti project and the Iraqi 
project is 20 kilometers.
278
  
Kuwait has followed a cooperative and transparent method in dealing with issues 
between itself and Iraq by eliminating any misunderstandings or misconceptions that may 
be incorrectly utilized to serve other purposes. Furthermore, Kuwait expressed its 
willingness through its foreign minister to help Iraq in developing its infrastructure. Kuwait 
can help Iraq in many aspects, especially since Kuwait has a more developed financial 
sector and can play the role of the banker with Iraq. Kuwait can also cooperate with Iraq by 
investing in and participating in the rebuilding of Iraq; it can also cooperate with Iraq in 
dealing with its environmental and maritime issues. Additionally, Kuwait can also assist 
Iraq in the warding off of terrorism and terrorist groups, for a stable Iraq is better for 
Kuwait than an unstable Iraq. The areas in which Kuwait and a democratic Iraq can 
cooperate are infinite. 
Kuwait has also reactivated its foreign policy of establishing close economic, 
political and military ties with many countries in the region, as well as international 
players. To start with, Kuwait has built strong supportive relations for itself with larger 
regional and international entities such as the United States, the European Union (EU) and 
the GCC, in addition to other influential countries within the international arena.
279
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has built up strategic relations with the United States and is considered a strategic partner 
where their relations encompass multiple facets of cooperation. Kuwait is also a full and 
active member of the GCC. The GCC provides regional depth to Kuwait since there is a 
commutative arrangement between its countries in all aspects, be they economic, financial, 
cultural or otherwise. There is also a commutative obligation towards maintaining mutual 
security. 
Clearly, the GCC enjoys significant strategic importance. The Council has 
established close and institutionalized relations with the EU and many other major powers 
who are committed to the stability of the countries within the GCC through the building of 
strategic dialogues and economic cooperation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
Despite worldly changes and development throughout the decades, Kuwait‟s 
national security has always been attested by its geographical location and historical 
consequences. The issue of political boundaries between Kuwait and Iraq is considered to 
be the oldest and most pressing border concern in the Gulf region. 
Kuwait has aimed at opening a new page of friendly cooperative relations with the 
newly-democratic Iraq with aims at collaborating in different aspects of economic, 
financial, and security coordination, seeking to enhance security and prosperity in its 
neighbor state. Kuwait‟s strategic concept of building a foundation of intertwined interests 
with Iraq will enhance cooperation and coordination between the two countries which 
would render any possible tension between them unlikely.  
The confluence of Kuwait‟s strategic location, its small size and massive oil wealth 
have made it vulnerable in a region where rivals have been competing over its geostrategic 
importance. Since Iraq‟s independence, and throughout the political history of both Iraq 
and Kuwait, Iraq had been trying to seize parts of Kuwait‟s northern territory, including the 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan; on other occasions, Iraq had actually claimed the whole of 
Kuwait‟s territory based on invalid justifications and fallacies. Iraq had set claims over 
Kuwait in 1938, in 1961, and again in 1990, spanning over the Hashemite rule, the militant 
communist regime, and the radical nationalist Ba‟athist regime, respectively.  
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This study has provided a detailed analysis about the territory of Kuwait, 
documenting the evolution of Kuwait‟s international boundaries from the Ottoman Empire 
(and before) until the U.N.‟s demarcation efforts. Historical facts illustrate that Kuwait‟s 
existence dates back to the 17th century where it was referred to as al-Qurain and was 
dominated by settlements who had built a fortress named al-Kout there. Starting from the 
18th century, the Al-Sabah family had governed Kuwait. Since then, this oil-rich 
sheikhdom has distinguished itself and maintained its autonomy. In 1899, Sheikh Mubarak 
the Great had conducted a secret treaty with the British to counterbalance the Ottomans in 
regards to any attempts to seek influence over Kuwait.  
In 1913, and by the Anglo-Ottoman Convention, Kuwait‟s boundary had been 
depicted by an inner and outer zone of Al-Sabah influence. The articles of the convention 
had set the delimitation of Kuwait‟s northern borders with the Vilayet of Basra, making 
distinct recognition between the two territories. In 1922, with the setting of the boundaries 
between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq arose the Uqair Protocol. Furthermore, in 1923, 
official correspondences between British officials confirmed the green line as defining the 
Kuwait boundary; this was regarded by Britain to have defined the Kuwait-Iraq border. 
With the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Iraq and the ruler of Kuwait in 
1932, Kuwait‟s border limitations had been specifically set and agreed upon by both 
Kuwait and Iraq. The 1963 Agreed Minutes confirmed the boundary delimitation as 
specified in the 1932 exchange of letters. Lastly, after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the efforts of the international coalition forces, Kuwait was liberated; it felt gratitude 
towards the coalition forces, especially to the United States with whom it has maintained 
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strong ties. With the liberation of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council issued many 
resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait which ultimately led to the 
formation of UNIKBDC and the setting of the final international border between Iraq and 
Kuwait.  
The fall of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime in 2003 has opened a new chapter 
in Iraqi politics and hopefully in Iraq‟s turbulent relations with all its neighbors. While far 
from being a stable polity, post-2003 Iraq is clearly a more pluralistic polity. Iraq‟s ability 
to threaten its neighbors has also clearly diminished; while the new regime has been keen 
on appeasing its Syrian and especially Iranian neighbors. There are also some manifest 
signs that the Iraqi government wants an improved relationship with Kuwait such as the 
resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries as well as the exchange of 
ambassadors. As for Kuwait, and given its painful past with Iraq, transforming the 
relationship with its more populous and militarily stronger neighbor to one that is based on 
collaboration and friendship cannot but be in the national interest. Iraq has never been the 
only source of external threat to Kuwait. Iran has had its own historic ambitions on the Gulf 
region; although Kuwait and Iran share neighborly ties and enjoy good bilateral relations, 
these relations have been strained lately due to some speculated Iranian intervention in 
Kuwaiti internal affairs. Kuwait, or for the matter any Gulf state, has very little in common 
with Iran whether in terms of ideology or foreign policy orientation. Indeed. One may 
argue that Iran today may represent a greater threat possibility to Kuwait‟s internal stability 
and regional role than Iraq. In formulating its foreign policy in its immediate region, the 
Kuwaiti Government cannot but take account of the following factors. First, there is a new 
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regime in Iraq that has different priorities and follows a different decision-making process 
than the previous one. Second, Iraq has been weakened and is unlikely to threaten any of its 
neighbors in the foreseeable future. Third, Iran has been the primary beneficiary of the 
withering of Iraq and is now acting as the region‟s main power. This transformed 
geopolitical map in the Gulf warrants reassessment of Kuwaiti foreign policy.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Excerpt from the Anglo-Ottoman Convention Agreement of 1913 
 “Article 1: The district of Kuwait as defined in Articles 5 and 7 of this 
agreement shall constitute an independent territory in the Ottoman Empire. 
Article 2: The Shaikh of Kuwait can, as he used to in the past, hoist the 
Ottoman flag in addition to the word [Kuwait] to be inscribed in one of the 
flag‟s corners, if he so desires. He may also exercise an independent 
administration in the regional area as defined by Article [5] of the 
agreement. The Imperial Ottoman State shall refrain from any intervention 
in the affairs of Kuwait, including the inheritance [of rulership], and any 
other administrative act as well as any occupation or military action in the 
provinces belonging to Kuwait. 
Article 3: The Imperial Ottoman Government recognizes the validity of the 
agreements formely concluded by the Shaikh of Kuwait with the 
Government of His Majesty the King of Britain dated January 23, 1899; 
May 24, 1900, and February 28, 1904 [Annexes 1-3]*. It also recognizes 
the validity of the land concessions granted from the said Shaikh to the 
Government of His Majesty the King and to the British nationals, and 
recognizes the validity of the demands enclosed with the memorandum sent 
on Oct. 24, 1911 from His Majesty‟s First Secretary for Foreign Affairs to 
the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in London. 
Article 4: In order to reaffirm the mutual understanding between the two 
governments held before, and pertinent to the exchange of assurances dated 
Sep.6, 1901 between the Embassy of H. Majesty the King of Britain in 
Constantinople and the Imperial Foreign Ministry, the Government of H.M. 
the King declares that as long as the Imperial Ottoman Government does 
not effect any change in the existing situation in Kuwait as defined in the 
agreement, it will not change the nature of its relation with the Government 
of Kuwait and will not endeavor to establish a protectorate. The Imperial 
Ottoman Government shall acknowledge having taken note of this 
declaration. 
Article 5: The independence of the Shaikh of Kuwait can be exercised in 
the defined districts forming a semi-circle with the City of Kuwait in the 
Centre and Khor al-Zubair in the northern border and the Grane in the 
southern border, and this line drawn in red on the map attached to this 
agreement, and the island of Warba, Bubiyan, Meskan, Failaka, Auha, 
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Kubbar, Garoa and Um al-Maradem in addition to the neighboring islands 
and the waters in this region. 
Article 6: The tribes inside the borders agreed upon in the next article shall 
be recognized as subordinate to the Shaikh of Kuwait who levies the Zakat 
as he used to do formerly. He shall exercise the administrative rights 
invested in him as an Ottoman Qu‟immaqam. The Imperial Ottoman 
Government shall not exercise in these regions any administrative act 
independent of the Shaikh of Kuwait and shall refrain from establishing 
garrisons or undertaking any military action of any type without prior 
understanding with the Government of His Majesty. 
Article 7:  The border of the country in the preceding article shall be 
defined as follows: [The border line begins at the coast at the mouth of 
Khor al-Zubair in the North West and extends exactly south of Um Qasr, 
Safwan and Sanam mountain. In the same way, those locations and their 
wells shall be left for the province [vilayet] of Basra. Upon reaching al-
Batin, they follow till the South West then turn to the South East till the sea 
nearby Muneifa mountain. This line is marked in green on the map attached 
to this agreement].. 
Article 8: In the event of the agreement of the Ottoman Imperial 
Government with the Government of His Majesty on extending the 
Baghdad-Basra railway to the sea and considering Kuwait as the terminal 
point of that way or any terminal point within the independent country, the 
two government shall agree on adopting measures for the protection of the 
railway as well as the establishing of customs and commercial warehouses 
and any other establishments linked with that line. 
Article 9: The Shaikh of Kuwait shall have complete freedom in exercising 
his rights on his own properties in the Basra province provided such 
exercise shall be in conformity with the Ottoman law; these [immovable] 
properties shall be subject to taxation and the rules pertinent to their 
preservation, financing and legality as decided by Ottoman laws. 
Article 10: Criminals of the neighboring provinces shall not be accepted in 
Kuwait and should be expelled, if inside; it is to be understood that 
Ottoman authorities shall not construe this condition as a justification for 
intervention in the neighboring provinces.” 280 
 
                                                          
280 Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation op. cit, pp. 25 - 27  
